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ABSTRACT
The Effect of Welfare Reform on Childbirth,
Marriage, and Divorce. (August 2009)
Pimrak Pakdeethai, B.A., Chulalongkorn University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Manuelita Ureta
This dissertation contains two essays on the effect of welfare reform on child-
birth, marriage, and divorce. In the first essay, I exploit the cross state variation in
welfare reform implementation to identify its effect on birth rates. The results from
multinomial logit models suggest that the welfare reform significantly increased the
probability of marital births. The out-of-wedlock birth rates decreased but this effect
is not significant. The strong work incentives decrease birth rates in both marital
and non-marital statuses suggesting that bearing a child is not appealing for women
who are more progressive in careers. However, the most aggressive welfare policy
significantly increases marital birth as expected. Birth rates among teenage girls are
not affected by the welfare reform. I further investigate the effect of the family cap
policy. Using a semi-natural experiment, I compare the birth rate of women who
already have had a second or higher order birth (treatment group) to women who
have had one child (comparison group), in states with and without family caps. The
difference in difference estimates reveal a strictly negative effect of family caps on the
higher order birth rates as expected.
In the second essay, I use reduced-form estimation and cross-state variation in
timing of reform adoption to extract both mechanical and behavioral effects of welfare
reform on marriage and divorce likelihood. I construct a flow measure of marriage and
divorce by matching individuals in the Current Population Survey from March 1988B
to 2002 and observing changes in marital status. I introduce a converse matching
iv
procedure to detect women who are not in the survey for two consecutive years. I
find that the welfare reform has a significantly negative effect on marriage rates and
an insignificant effect on divorce rates. The Difference-in-Difference estimates sug-
gest that marriage among disadvantaged women is negatively affected by the welfare
reform. I also provide a theoretical model to decompose the effect of welfare reform
on marriage due to each of the components of the reform, i.e., time limits, work sanc-
tions, earnings disregards, and maximum cash benefits. My results provide a novel
explanation for the effects of work incentives and welfare restrictions on marriage.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Government assistance for families with dependent children (AFDC) had been op-
erating since 1935 and lasted for almost 60 years. Single mothers were primary
beneficiaries at the moment while many social problems such as increases in female
headship rates, teen motherhood, out-of-wedlock births, welfare caseload, etc., arose.
The AFDC opponents argue that welfare may have been responsible for them. In
1996, Clinton passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcil-
iation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and turned welfare to a new chapter of reform by
making recipients work.
Purposes of TANF are the followings:
1. To provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in
their own homes or in the homes of relatives.
2. To end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting
job preparation, work, and marriage.
3. To prevent and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies.
4. To encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.
All the states completely replaced AFDC by the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) program between 1996 to 1998. Before the implementation of
TANF, some states were granted permission to experiment with some of the TANF
provisions such as time limits, family caps, work requirement, etc. These were called
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Political Economy.
2“waivers” and were considered as a first step towards the welfare reform. The new
which lead to changes in many social outcomes; e.g, welfare use, labor force partici-
pation, education, fertility, and family formations.
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the effect of overall welfare reform
on childbirth, marriage, and divorce using the data of Current Population Survey
(CPS) March 1988 to 2002. I exploit the cross state variation in welfare reform
implementation to identify its effect. Due to the fact that each state receives block
grant from the federal government and sets up its own independent program following
TANF guidelines, welfare policies vary across states and years. The effect of individual
welfare policy is also identifiable from a variation in degree of welfare rules.
The first essay of this dissertation, Chapter II, analyzes the effect of welfare re-
form on birth rates among adults and teenagers by introducing a multinomial logit
model. This model is unique for this type of research question because it allows for
the fertility comparison between non-marital, marital child births, and no childbirth.
It provides a suitable econometric framework to understand fertility behavior, specif-
ically when the fertility is jointly determined with marriage decisions. The results
from multinomial logit models suggest that the welfare reform significantly increased
the probability of marital births. The out-of-wedlock birth rates also decreased but
this effect is not significant. The strong work incentives decrease birth rates in both
marital and non-marital statuses suggesting that bearing a child is not appealing for
women who are more exposed to career environment. However, the most aggressive
welfare policy significantly increases marital birth. Birth rates among teenage girls
are not affected by the welfare reform. I further investigate the effect of the family
cap policy. Using a semi-natural experiment, I compare the birth rate of women who
already have had a second or higher order birth (treatment group) to women who
have had one child (comparison group), in states with and without family caps. The
3difference-in-difference estimates reveal a strictly negative effect of family caps on the
higher order birth rates as expected.
In the second essay of this dissertation I examine the effect of welfare reform
on marriage and divorce. I construct a measure of marriage and divorce rates by
matching individuals across a pair of year in CPS from March 1988 to 2002. I also
introduce a new matching procedure called “converse matching”. This matching
allows me to also match women who appear only one time by matching through
their newly wed husbands (marriage rate) or newly divorced ex-husbands (divorce
rate). I find that welfare reform has a significant negative effect on the marriage rate
and an insignificant negative effect on the divorce rate. The Difference-in-Difference
estimates also yield a consistent result with the probit model. By decomposing the
components of welfare reform, e.g. time limits, work sanctions, earning disregards,
and maximum cash benefits, I find that a negative effect of welfare reform comes from
self sufficiency in work incentives. However, least attractive welfare policies increase
marriage which suggesting that women consider marriage as an alternative financial
support when government aids become uncharitable.
4CHAPTER II
THE EFFECT OF WELFARE REFORM ON CHILDBIRTH
A. Introduction
During the 1980s and 1990s, increasing trends in teenage motherhood, out-of-wedlock
births, and female headship were well recognized and became the main targets of the
welfare reform. Previous studies have found mixed evidence on whether the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was responsible for these
trends. The estimated effect of AFDC on the U.S. family structure is inconclusive.
Yet, the program was reformed in 1996. All the states completely replaced AFDC
by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program between 1996 to
1998. Before the implementation of TANF, some states were granted permission to
experiment with some of the TANF provisions such as time limits, family caps, work
requirement, etc. These were called “waivers” and were considered as a first step
towards the welfare reform.
It has been more than a decade since the welfare program underwent a major
overhaul in order to address these social problems along with a large fiscal deficit. The
welfare reform and its results were acknowledged as great achievements. By imposing
many restrictive rules that emphasize self reliance through work promotion, welfare
caseloads dropped dramatically. Unfortunately, the channels leading to such results
are unclear. Even though caseload reduction was mainly a result of welfare recipients’
inability to comply with the new restrictive welfare policies, it is also worthwhile to
investigate any simultaneous change in family composition during the same period
that might have made them immediately unqualified or less in need of welfare support.
As the welfare program after the reform became less generous, disadvantaged
5women had fewer incentives to give birth in order to qualify and participate in the
welfare system. Families without children are ineligible to recieve welfare benefits.
If fertility, birth rates, or number of children per family decrease, the proportion of
welfare-qualified families would decrease as well. As a result, it is not surprising to
witness a sharp reduction in welfare caseloads after the reform.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of welfare reform on
birth rates among adults and teenagers by introducing a multinomial logit model.
This model is unique for this type of research question as it allows for the fertility
comparison between non-marital, marital child births, and no childbirth. It provides
a suitable econometric framework to understand fertility behavior, specifically when
the fertility is jointly determined with marriage decisions. I find that the welfare
reform increases marital birth rates but it does not affect out-of-wedlock birth rates
when compared to a choice of having no birth. Teen birth rates are not significantly
affected by the welfare reform.
To complete the analysis, this paper also studies the effect of family caps on
fertility rates using “birth order” as an instrument. Among many other new policies
introduced in the reform, family caps is the policy targeting most directly the birth
rates of welfare recipients. This policy imposes a reduction or zero welfare benefit
offered for each additional child. Women living in a state with an effective family
cap policy would be more reluctant to bear higher-order children because the wel-
fare benefits are capped for additional children born while collecting benefits. Using
a semi-natural experiment, I compare the birth rate of women who already have a
second or higher order birth (treatment group) to women who have one child (com-
parison group), between states with family caps and states without family caps. The
difference-in-difference estimates reveal a strictly negative effect of family caps on the
higher order birth rate as expected.
6The validity of the difference-in-difference methodology requires that the fertility
trend between treatment and control groups is parallel during the non-family cap
period. Determining treatment and control groups effectively is a real challenge.
Both groups should posses similar characteristics leading to similar outcomes when
the family cap policy has not yet been implemented. Yet a treatment group is a group
at high risk and a control group is a group at low-risk to be affected by the policy.
B. Literature Review
Many previous papers study the effect of pre-reform welfare benefits on social out-
comes including welfare participation rates, poverty rates, family formation, among
others. Previous studies have found mixed evidence on whether the Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was responsible for these trends.
Danziger et al. (1982), Ellwood and Bane (1985), Duncan and Hoffman (1990), Fos-
sett and Kiecolt (1993), and Lundberg and Plotnick (1995) concluded that AFDC
led to an undesirable family structure in the U.S. Acs (1996), An, Haveman, and
Wolfe (1993), Darity and Myers (1983), Lichter et al. (1992), Plotnick (1990), and
Robins and Fronstin (1996) found an insignificant effect of AFDC on these problems.
The rest of the studies (see Freshnock and Cutright (1979); Hoynes (1995); Janowitz
(1976); Lundberg and Plotnick (1990); Moffitt (1990); Moffitt (1994); Moore and
Caldwell (1977); Rank (1989); Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994); Schultz (1994) ) found
mixed or converse results. Most studies also found a stronger and/or more significant
effect of AFDC on whites than blacks–who are common welfare recipients.
The government welfare program and its effect on family formation and fertility
decisions among disadvantaged women have captured increasing attention over the
years. Using cross-state variation in benefit levels is the most common method of
7identifying the effect of AFDC on fertility. However, if fertility systematically varies
across states with different levels of welfare benefits due to other reasons, such as social
norms, the results obtained through this identification method can be spurious. As
a result, cross-state variation in benefit changes, also known as the state-fixed effects
model, has become increasingly utilized. Changes over time in benefit levels across
states are used to explain changes over time in several social outcomes such as fertility,
marriage, divorce and others.
Many studies examine the effect of welfare reform by exploiting cross-state vari-
ation in the set of outcomes observed in either state- or individual-level data. Lopoo
and DeLeire (2006) used natality data from the National Center for Health Statistics
and found that the fertility rate of minor parents aged 15–17 declined more than in
the control group of 18-year-olds. Even though the state-level data, for example, fer-
tility and marriage rates from the Vital Statistics, virtually collects all occurrence in a
particular state, it lacks detail for a more in-depth analysis. Individual-level data, in-
stead, allows for the difference-in-difference strategy since welfare reform should have
a greater impact on disadvantaged women who are at high risk of welfare dependency.
Kaestner, Korenman, and O’Neill (2003) and Offner (2005) therefore applied this
method to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79 and NLSY97) and
the Current Population Survey March Supplement (CPS 1989–2001), respectively,
to investigate the outcomes among female teenagers. The results from both studies
supported the findings of Lopoo and DeLeire (2006) who used state-level aggregate
data.
There is no consensus on whether to perform race-specific or race-inclusive anal-
ysis. Due to data limitations, some studies cannot analyze the impact of welfare
across race. However, most papers find a stronger and more significant effect of wel-
fare reform on outcome for whites than blacks (for a summary, see Moffitt (1998)).
8This suggests that there exist racial differences in the responses to the changes in the
welfare program and therefore each race should be analyzed separately. This type
of study imposes the assumption that the classical error terms are race-specific. For
example, out-of-wedlock births accounted for 26 percent of fertility among whites
and 69 percent among blacks. Willis (1999) captured the differences between whites
and blacks in fertility choices by constructing an out-of-wedlock model considering
women and men as separate decision units. He found that a marriage market equilib-
rium may exist in which children are born within marriages of high-income parents,
whereas in low-income groups men father children from multiple partners outside of
marriage. In this paper, I examine the effect of welfare reform on the pooled sample
and separating blacks and whites.
Prior to TANF implementation, many states adopted waivers to test a variety
of new welfare policies by randomly assigning welfare participants into experiment
and control groups. The experiment groups were subjected to new rules while con-
trol groups remained in the AFDC regime. These experiments were designed for
studying different reform policies such as family caps, time limits, work sanctions,
and many others. Yet the results are state-specific and may not be externally vali-
dated at a national level. Jagannathan, Camasso, and Killingsworth (2004) studied
the impact of the family cap policy on the fertility behavior of welfare recipients
in New Jersey by exploiting the results from the experiment group1. They found
that family caps reduced births among blacks. Dyer and Fairlie (2005b) applied a
difference-in-difference-in-difference approach to the Current Population Survey data
from 1989 to 1999 and found that the family cap policies did not reduce the incidence
of out-of-wedlock births among single less-educated women with children.
1NJ is the first state that implemented family caps.
9C. Contribution
All of the previous studies use either logistic or probit regressions to identify the effect
of welfare on fertility. The fertility decisions of interest, however, are more focused
on non-marital or out-of-wedlock childbearing. It is important to distinguish the
births between within and outside marriages as both fertility and marriage are jointly
determined and they can be affected differently by the welfare reform. In this paper, I
do not consider the timing of fertility and marriage decisions, for example, conception
followed by marriage or vice versa, because this cannot be captured in my data. I
apply a multinomial logit model to segragate the un-ordered fertility choices between
non-marital childbirth, marital childbirth, and no childbirth. I do not consider a
multinomial logit model of four choices, i.e., no childbirth and not being married, no
childbirth and being married, marital childbirth, and non-marital childbirth because
it will yield more imprecise estimates while offering no real advantages for this type
of analysis.
The main advantage of using multinomial logit model, in comparison to logit or
probit, is that it allows a comparison analysis of multiple relevant choices of fertility
and marriage at the same time. This is particularly important since the welfare reform
also negatively affect marriage rate (see Bitler et al. (2004) and Pakdeethai (2008)).
Even though policy makers aim to reduce the out-of-wedlock birthrate, marital
births may also decrease if the policy of welfare reform negatively affect birthrates as
a whole. Welfare reform may, in turn, cause a relatively increase in marital birth by
attracting those women who otherwise would have borne children outside marriage.
These phenomena cannot be captured by a simple logit (or probit) regression.
I focus on three choices: no birth, out-of-wedlock birth, and marital birth. I do
not disaggregate “no birth” choice based on marital status, i.e., single without birth
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and married without birth because this paper aims to study birth rates in which
the appropriate reference choice is no birth (regardless a marital status). Including
marital status as an additional choice of no birth decision unnecessarily complicate
the analysis. Estimates obtained from a multinomial logit model must be interpreted
relatively to a reference choice. If a reference choice is “single and no birth” ( or
“married and no birth”) instead of “no birth”, the estimates on out-of-wedlock or
marital birth rates cannot be measured properly.
Since family caps is the most direct policy introduced in the welfare reform
targeting fertility decisions, it is worthwhile to study the effect of family caps on
birth rates. Even though there are a handful of papers studying this policy on fertility
decisions, most of them apply the difference-in-difference-in-difference model between
control and treatment groups during the pre- and post-family caps periods within
family cap states. The typical control groups are disadvantaged women with children
and the treatment groups are non-disadvantaged women with children (For example,
see Dyer and Fairlie (2005a).). However, the family cap policy, which reduces the
financial incentives for additional fertility, should affect disadvantaged women to a
different degree according to their number of pre-existing children. In this paper, I
apply the difference-in-difference model to the analysis of family caps. I use the “birth
order” as an instrument to identify the treatment and control groups. I compare the
birth rates of disadvantaged women at the second or higher order (control group) with
that of the first order (comparison group) between states with and without family
caps.
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D. Theory
The AFDC program was designed primarily to aid single women with children. The
implication is that the availability of welfare lowers the cost of childbearing to unwed
mothers relative to not having a child or having a marital childbearing. The welfare
reform introduced many new policies that made welfare support less attractive to
potential welfare recipients. By offering a smaller cash benefit, it would theoretically
increase the private cost of out-of-wedlock childbearing, and other fertility options,
such as marital childbearing and no childbearing would become relatively more ap-
pealing. If a woman decides to bear a child, an increase in the cost of childbearing
can be partially alleviated by the presence of the spouse. Work requirement is one
of the new additions to the welfare program. It improves the women’s employment
opportunity and helps them gain self sufficiency. The theory of childbearing suggests
that a change in wage rates ambiguously affects the fertility rate.
In special cases, a small number of married parents were eligible and received
welfare from the AFDC-UP program. By eliminating differences in eligibility2 for two-
parent versus one-parent families, any disincentive toward marital fertility associated
with welfare eligibility rules should be mechanically removed and lead to a lower rate
of non-marital childbearing.
Family caps is the policy designed to directly target fertility decisions among
welfare recipients. Even though it is not mandatory for states to adopt family caps,
many states imposed and maintain the policy. Other states either never implemented
it or opted out of it in later years. Women receiving welfare under a family caps
regime will receive lower or no additional benefit for an extra child born. As a result,
family cap policy provides a financial disincentive for higher-order fertility.
2They are known as the “100-hour rule” and work history requirement.
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Grogger, Karoly, and Klerman (2002) suggest that any policy change that makes
welfare relatively more attractive (e.g., higher benefit levels, more financial work in-
centives, no time limits, or lenient work sanction) will raise fertility (and especially
non-marital fertility) and decrease marriage. Conversely, any policy change that
makes welfare relatively less attractive will lower fertility (and non-marital fertility)
and increase marriage. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the find-
ings of Pakdeethai (2008) in which she examined and estimated the effect of welfare
attractiveness on marriage decisions.
The number of teenage pregnancies climbed during 1980’s. The policy makers
addressed this critical problem by requiring minors with children to reside with their
parents or relatives. The policy would make teenage pregnancies much less beneficial
to those who perceived that a pregnancy can be used as a quick fix to avoid living
with parents. As a result, the welfare reform should reduce teenage childbearing.
I hypothesize that welfare reform reduces out-of-wedlock birth rates and in-
creased the marital birth rates among adults and teenagers. As financial incentives
to have additional children are removed under the family caps regime, disadvantaged
women with higher completed fertility are hypothesized to bear fewer children than
do disadvantaged women with lower completed fertility.
E. Econometric Framework
Previous studies use either logistic or probit regressions to identify the effect of wel-
fare on fertility. The fertility decisions of interest, however, are more focused on
non-marital or out-of-wedlock childbearing. It is important to distinguish the births
between within and outside marriages as both fertility and marriage are jointly de-
termined and they can be affected differently by the welfare reform. In this study I
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analyze 3 choices: non-marital childbirth, marital childbirth, and no childbirth using
a multinomial logit estimation. The model
Pr(yi = j) =
exp(Xiβj)
1 +
∑J
j exp(Xiβj)
(2.1)
Pr(yi = 0) =
1
1 +
∑J
j exp(Xiβj)
(2.2)
where
yi = j Fertility choice j (out-of-wedlock birth or marital birth) of observation i
yi = 0 Fertility reference choice (no birth) of observation i
Xi Explanatory variables associated to observation i
βj Coefficients associated to fertility choice j
Pr(yi = j) Probability of choice j being chosen
For an analysis of the effect of family caps on fertility , I use a difference-in-
difference model by identifying the treatment and control groups in probit model3.
Therefore, the sample of interest consists of women with at least one child before the
interviewing year. I do not include women who have not yet had children because they
are not eligible for welfare benefits and their childbearing decisions are potentially
different from the ones who already have them. Disadvantaged women who already
have at least two children 4 besides the child born in the interviewing year are in
the treatment group. I use three different control groups. The control groups consist
of disadvantaged women who already have one child 4 , non-disadvantaged women
who already have at least two children 4 , and non-disadvantaged women who already
3Different from a multinomial logit, the decision choices are only live birth and no
birth.
4Exclude any child born in the interviewing year.
14
have one child. These control groups are valid under assumption that the family cap
policy did not alter poverty rate and fertility decisions among control groups.
Since the explained variable, child birth and no child birth, is a restricted value
between zero and one, the difference-in-difference model can be estimated from a
probit model in a non-traditional way (see Puhani (2008)). Let a linear regression to
estimate a treatment effect be defined as follow:
yi = Xiθ + α+ βTreat+ γFamCaps + τTreatxFamCaps (2.3)
where
yi is a continuous outcome of interest.
Xi is a set of covariates.
θ is a set of parameters associated to their covariates.
Treat is an indicator of treatment group.
FamCaps is an indicator of family cap policy.
TreatxFamCaps is an interaction term.
The treatment effect on the treated at the time of treatment is:
τ(T = 1, F = 1) = E[y1|T = 1, F = 1, X]−E[y0|T = 1, F = 1, X] (2.4)
Where y1 is an outcome of treated group and y0 is an outcome of untreated group.
The expected counterfactual potential outcome of untreated group, y0, conditional on
the policy F (Family Caps), the group T (Treatment), and attributes X is specified
as
E[y0|T = 1, F = 1, X] = α + β + γ +Xiθ (2.5)
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The potential outcome under treatment for a treated group is
E[y1|T = 1, F = 1, X] = α + β + γ + τ +Xiθ (2.6)
Equation 2.4 is derived from equation 2.5 and 2.6. The treatment effect on the
treated during the time of treatment, τ , is simply identified by an interaction effect
in a linear model 2.3. Nevertheless, the probit estimation is a non-linear function and
the treatment effect on the treated group cannot be simply identified like the one in
2.3. A probit model is defined as follow:
Pr[Yi = 1|Xi] = Φ(Xiθ + α + βTreat+ γFamCaps+ τTreatxFamCaps) (2.7)
or
E[Y |T, F,X] = Φ(Xiθ + α + βTreat+ γFamCaps+ τTreatxFamCaps) (2.8)
where
Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution function ∈ [0, 1].
Yi is a childbearing decision of woman i.
It equals one if she has an infant and equals zero otherwise.
Xi is a set of covariates.
θ is a set of parameters associated to their covariates.
Unlike the linear difference-in-difference model, the treatment effect from the
non-linear difference-in-difference model cannot be achieved directly from the esti-
mated parameter of the interactive term, τ , because group and policy differences in
the conditional expectation of the bounded outcome Y are not constant and therefore
α, β, and γ are not canceled out. According to equations 2.4 and 2.8, Puhani (2008)
shows that the treatment effect in probit “difference-in-difference” model equals to
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the difference in two cross differences as follow:
τ(T = 1, F = 1, X) = Φ(α0 + α1 + α2 + α3 +Xβ)− Φ(α0 + α1 + α2 +Xβ) (2.9)
The set of individual control variables X includes race5, age, Marriageable Men
Pool Index (MMPI), Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), motherhood status, par-
ticipation in labor force, and wage rate. I also include a set of state-level variables
such as covenant marriage laws, unilateral divorce laws, and unemployment rate6.
It is common that women who anticipate childbearing, for instance, women dur-
ing their last tri-semester of pregnancy until a born child are few-months matured,
may self-select to drop out of the labor force and therefore their wage rates are cen-
sored. To account for any selection bias, I use the Heckman two-step selection model.
The first stage is the specification of the selection decision to participate in the la-
bor force in the format of cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution (Φ) with a vector of explanatory variables (Z) and a vector of unknown
parameters (θ).
Pr(LFPR = 1|Z) = Φ(Zθ + u1) (2.10)
where
LFPR is a labor force participation rate. It equals one if a wage rate is observable.
Z is a set of covariates affecting a decision to join a labor force.
u1 is a disturbance term with zero mean and unit variance.
Z in a selection model includes marital status, education attainment,age, age
squared, race, presence of pre-school children, number of children, unemployment
5Black, white, and hispanic.
6It is constructed by state and year from CPS data.
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rate, EITC expansion, and welfare reform7. The wage equation is introduced in the
second stage to correct for self-selection by incorporating a transformation of the pre-
dicted probability obtained from the first stage as an additional explanatory variable.
The observed wage equation is identified as follows.
w∗ = Rβ + u2 (2.11)
w∗ denotes the observed wage rate deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
if the selection equation 2.10 is greater than zero. R is a set of covariates affecting
a wage rate. It includes education attainment, race, age, age squared, MSA, and
median of female wage rate8. I use a median of female wage rate to capture the
wage environment for women in each particular state and year. Ideally, occupation
is a more precise variable to predict wage rates. However, occupations for women
who are not in a labor force are unobservable and therefore wage rates estimated on
occupation cannot be predicted for them. The Heckman two-step selection model
also assumes the errors are jointly normal:


u1i
u2i

 ∼ N




0
0

 ,


1 ρ
ρ σ2u



 (2.12)
The conditional expectation of wages given the person works is then
E[w|X,Participate = 1] = Xβ + E[u|X,Participate = 1]
E[w|X,Participate = 1] = Xβ + ρσuλ(Zθ) (2.13)
Equation 2.13 is a standard-form of heckman sample selection model where ρ
7Both EITC expansion and welfare reform stimulate more labor force among the
poor.
8I obtained a median of female wage rates by year and state from CPS data.
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is the correlation between unobserved determinants of propensity to work, σu is the
standard deviation of u, and λ is the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at Zθ. When the
same covariates appear in the selection equation and the equation of interest, the
identification of the selection equation based on the normality assumption.
I then include the estimated probability of individual participation rate and the
estimated wage rate obtained from the heckman two-step model into the set of control
variables for the logit estimation of childbearing choices.
F. Data
I use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) 1988–2002 (The Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the Census Bureau (2005)). The data covers the periods of pre- and
post-welfare reform. The monthly survey includes 50,000 households or approximately
120,000 individuals. I restrict my sample to women aged 15 to 44. The teenagers are
women aged 15 to 19 and adults are women aged 20 to 44. I examine the effect of
welfare reform among teenagers and adults separately.
I computed the live birth rate for women whose child is under 12 months old
by March of each particular year of survey. The infant is an indicator for natality in
each year. The fertility and live birth rates are different. Giving birth involves many
decisions, beginning with sexual activity and contraceptive methods which might lead
to a conception. After becoming pregnant, a woman decides either to interrupt 9 or
carry her pregnancy to full-term. In order to give birth to a live infant, a woman
must make these decisions in a particular set of choices.
Due to data limitations, I cannot obtain woman’s history of sexual activity,
contraceptive method, and abortion. However, the analysis of live births remain
9I assume that miscarriages are exogenous.
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important because it captures the end result of the effect of welfare reform. For
policy makers it is also worthwhile to understand the effect of welfare reform on each
particular stage which is not included in this study.
The live birth rate can be categorized into 2 types, i.e, non-marital (out-of-
wedlock) and marital births. Women who do not have any infant will not contribute
to a live birth rate.
For the analysis of the family cap policy on live birth rate, I constructed treatment
and control groups by the order of births. The treatment group contains disadvan-
taged women who have at least two children prior to the interviewing year. I consider
women whose family incomes fall below 10 percentile among women in each particu-
lar year and state as the disadvantaged group. I define 3 different control groups to
ensure the quality of the estimated results. The control groups are defined as follows:
1. Control group 1: Disadvantaged women with one child prior to the interviewing
year.
2. Control group 2: Non-disadvantaged women with at least two children prior to
the interviewing year.
3. Control group 3: Non-disadvantaged women with one child prior to the inter-
viewing year.
Welfare policy data on the timing and details of the welfare reform in each states
were collected from the green book series (The Committee on Ways and Means of the
U.S. House of Representatives (1996)) and the State Policy Documentation Project
(SPDP) web site (The State Policy Documentation Project (2007)), from the pre- and
post-reform10. The cash welfare value used in this study is a logarithm of deflated
10For additional details, see Pakdeethai (2008).
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maximum cash benefit for a family of three varied across states and years.
During the period under analysis, there was an expansion of the Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC) program introduced in 1975. EITC was modified in 1986,
1990 and 199311, and became the largest government cash-transfer program. The tax
reforms increased EITC only for families with positive incomes. Even though the pri-
mary purpose of EITC is to encourage the working poor to work more, the tax credit
schedule, that differentiates families by numbers of children has an impact fertility
decisions. Families without children were not eligible for EITC until 1993 whereas
families with children were eligible for EITC12. Since the 1990 reform, however, fam-
ilies with at least two children qualify for the larger credits than do families with
only one child. As a result, prior to 1993, families with no children had an incentive
to have children and the incentive disappeared after 1993. Families with only one
child also have an incentive to conceive more children when EITC pays higher credits
to families with two or more children after 1990. The EITC different incentives for
childbearing depending on the number of children the families already have.
In addition, there are marriage-related laws that may affect the fertility choices
(inside and outside wedlock). These laws include unilateral(no-fault) divorce laws and
covenant marriage laws13 enacted by different states at different points in time. Most
states switched laws from mutual consent to unilateral or no-fault divorce between
1970-1985 prior to my analysis. Only twenty out of fifty-one states still have mutual
divorce laws. Optional covenant marriage laws in which the marrying couple agree
11The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts(OBRA) of 1990 and 1993.
12The tax credit paid to any working-poor families with children were subjected to
the same scheme regardless a number of children.
13It is more difficult for couples who have a legal covenant marriage to obtain a
divorce. Cause for divorce is typically limited to abuse, a felony with jail time, or
adultery.
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to obtain pre-marital counseling and accept more limited grounds for divorce is legal
in only 3 states; i.e, Louisiana(1997), Arizona(1998) and Arkansas(2001).
Summary statistics for the data used in this paper are reported in table I. The
table is divided into two periods, before and after the welfare reform. The overall
birth rate rose from 4.9 to 6 child births per 100 women14 after the reform was imple-
mented. Both increases in out-of-wedlock and marital births account for this trend.
Attributes such as age, wage, and Men Marriageable Pool Index (MMPI) remain sta-
ble throughout the sampling period. However, there is a lower female unemployment
rate during the mid 90’s and women aged 20–44 seemed to participate less in the
labor force during the same period of low unemployment rate. Unsurprisingly, the
average welfare cash benefit dropped with the reform.
G. Estimation Results
The labor force participation equation includes some variables that do not appear in
the wage equation. They are marital status, number of children prior to the interview-
ing year, presence of pre-school children, unemployment rate, EITC expansion15, and
welfare reform16. Table II reports the estimated selection and wage equations using
the Heckman Two-Step Selection Model. Married women self-select to not join the
labor force. The omitted category of education variable is “less than 1st grade”17 and
14Aged 20–44.
15the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts(OBRA) in 1990 and 1993. It is coded
to one if a woman is childless between 1994 to 2004 or she has children between 1991
to 2004.
16It is a share of year that welfare reform is in effect (from Marcht−1 to Marcht) if a
woman with children lives in a state where either the waivers or TANF are in effect;
it is zero otherwise.
17Of all women in the sample, point three percents obtain education less than the
first grade.
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the estimates reported in the selection equation show the increasing likelihood of par-
ticipating in the labor force as women acquire more education. Having any pre-school
children also causes a negative effect on joining the labor force. The EITC expan-
sion program (OBRA) also encouraged labor force participation among women with
children; however it discouraged it among women without children. As expected, the
welfare reform increases the probability of labor force participation for women with
children. ρ is negative and strongly significant which can be interpreted as evidence
that the unobserved characteristics sorting women to participate in the labor force
are negatively correlated with the unobserved characteristics in wage rate.
Table III reports the Relative Risk Ratio (RRR) estimates from the multinomial
logit model of women’s childbirth choices controlling for individual characteristics.
The base choice is “no childbirth” and other two choices are “out-of-wedlock birth”
and “marital birth”. Model (1) does not control for state or year fixed effects; model
(2) accounts state fixed effects; and model (3) controls for year fixed effects. Due to
the fact that I use cross-state variation in the times of welfare reform implementation
as an identification method (see figure 1), I cannot control for both state and year
fixed effects. However, I partially control state-year specific effects through several
state-year variables of birth-related decision such as unemployment rate, covenant
marriage law, unilateral divorce law, age and race composition, percentage of female,
percentage of samples living in MSA, and percentage of high school dropouts.
EITC expansion in which the eligibility is contingent on child presence statisti-
cally increases the probability of both out-of-wedlock and marital births. The effect
of welfare cash benefit is evaluated in a log form; however, it cannot be interpreted
directly as a percentage change in welfare benefit because of the nonlinear estimation.
There is sufficient evidence suggesting that welfare cash benefits raise the probability
of having an out-of-wedlock birth but lower the probability of a marital birth. The
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period during which welfare reform is in the effect shows a strong upward trend of
both marital and non-marital births. From now on I will focus my analysis on year
fixed effect model because birth rates impose a strong time trend that should be
controlled for and majority of my control variables such as state unemployment rate,
percentage of high-school dropouts, percentage of MSA, etc. is more state-specific
and therefore state fixed effect would have been already partially controlled for.
There is evidence of racial response difference to the welfare program documented
in the literature. I therefore analyze the effect of welfare separately for blacks and
whites as reported in table IV. The first column in table IV is specification (3) in
table III where year fixed effects are controlled for. The second column reports the
estimates using only black women and the third column uses only whites. The effect
of EITC is consistent across races; although the magnitudes are slightly different. For
example, blacks are almost 4 times more likely to have an out-of-wedlock birth than
having no birth compared to whites that are more than 6 times more likely. The
welfare reform does not affect any out-of-wedlock birth for both blacks and whites.
However, it increases a marital birth among whites by 18 percentage points when
compared to no childbirth.
The welfare reform not only implemented many new policies but it also adjusted
the existing policies. Welfare policies vary across states and times. The welfare
program is composed of four main policies: cash benefits, time limits, earned income
disregards, and work sanction. Each policy is categorized into three levels depending
on their benefits and restrictions. The details are described in the appendix. Table
V reports the effect of welfare policies on childbirth choices.
A high level of cash benefit insignificantly increases the likelihood of out-of-
wedlock births by 15 percentage points and it insignificantly decreases the marital
birth by 6 percent when compared to the likelihood of having no childbirth. The cash
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benefits mainly provided to single mothers attracts women to bear children out-of-
wedlock because the pecuniary cost of child rearing decreases and therefore the utility
of having out-of-wedlock children increases. Relatively to a choice of no birth, the
utility of having children inside the wedlock decreases because the alternative choice,
i.e, out-of-wedlock birth, becomes more attractive when the government provides
more transfer.
Time limits do not have any impact on either out-of-wedlock or marital births.
Earning disregards significantly decreases the probability of marital births. Work
sanction also significantly decreases birth rates in both statuses. I combine work
sanction and earning disregards into the direct work incentives. The statistical result
shows a strong and consistent evidence such that the strong work incentives suppress
birth rates in both marital and non-marital scenarios suggesting that child bearing
becomes less attractive when women are more exposed to working environment. Con-
sistent with hypothesis of Grogger, Karoly, and Klerman (2002) I also find that the
restrictive welfare rules increases marital birth probability by 15 percents whereas an
out-of-wedlock birth is left unaffected.
Teenager behavior in childbearing is always treated with a great concern as these
potentially young mothers are immature psychologically and financially. Majority of
teen mothers drops out of school and are in poverty. The children born to teen
mothers also suffer from adverse effects that carry out through their lifetimes (For
example, see Hunt (2006)). The effect of welfare reform on teen’s choices of childbirth
by race is reported in table VI. There is no significant effect of welfare reform on
teenage childbirth in neither the pooled samples of blacks and whites nor race-specific
analysis.
Family caps is the major policy implemented during the welfare reform in an
attempt to gain some control in fertility decision among the recipients. Table VII
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reports the difference-in-difference estimates on birth rates using three different con-
trol groups. The treatment group is disadvantaged women who have at least 2 prior
children before the interviewing year. The top panel reports the estimates without
controlling for individual characteristics and the bottom panel reports the estimates
with the characteristics control. The effect of family caps is very strong and robust
across control groups and characteristics control. The family caps gain the expected
decrease in birth rates for which it is designed. However, the results shown in table
VII is inappropriate for magnitude interpretation due to the nonlinearity nature of
the probit model. Table VIII accounts for this issue by following the method proposed
by Puhani (2008). The last column in table VIII (Diff-in-Diff) is the effect of family
caps in percentage points. The family caps reduce childbirth by 13 to 18 percentage
points without controlling for the individual characteristics. When characteristics are
accounted for, the negative effect of family caps on childbirth range between 0.12 and
5 percentage points.
H. Conclusion
The welfare program was reformed in different degrees across states and times to ac-
count for the rising trends in teenage motherhood, out-of-wedlock birth, and female
headship. This paper exploits the cross-state variation in welfare reform implemen-
tation during 1992 to 1998 to identify the effect of welfare reform on out-of-wedlock
and marital child births. The welfare reform is identified as effective if states either
adopt the welfare waivers or the TANF. I use the Current Population Survey (CPS),
March supplement to set up the data set composed of unmarried women with infants,
married women with infants, and women without infants. The infant is an indicator
for natality in each particular year during the sampling period.
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This study finds a positive overall effect of welfare reform on marital birth like-
lihood as compared to the likelihood of no childbirth. The out-of-wedlock birth in
year fixed effect specification seems to decrease as a result of welfare reform as well,
yet this effect is not significant. These results are consistent across different races.
Besides the overall effect of welfare reform, it is also interesting to policy makers
to understand how each welfare components, such as cash benefits, time limits, earn-
ing disregards, and work sanctions, affect childbirth choice. I categorize each welfare
policy into 3 levels according to the criteria proposed by Blank and Schmidt (2001)
and adjusted by Pakdeethai (2008). I find that the strong work incentives, defined as
a combination of strong work sanction or high earning disregards, have a strong neg-
ative effect on natality in both marital and non-marital statuses which suggests that
additional child bearing becomes less attractive when women are more progressive in
career. The restrictive welfare rules significantly increase marital birth. This result
supports the hypotheses of Grogger, Karoly, and Klerman (2002).
Family cap policies are the only reforms directly aimed to reduce the childbirth
rates among welfare recipients. I use the difference-in-difference estimation comparing
the treatment group with 3 different comparison groups by birth order. As expected,
the empirical results show a strong and consistent negative effect of family caps on
additional child births.
I estimate childbirth choices made by teenagers separately from the adults due
to the vast different nature of the subject. The overall effect of welfare reform do
not statistically affect the teenage’s child births. Nevertheless, there is evidence of
race-specific response to the welfare reform. Unlike adults, the black teenagers seem
to respond differently to the white counterparts in terms of magnitude and direction.
For example, the probability of marital birth among black teenagers significantly
decreased as a result of the welfare reform but the probability of marital birth among
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whites increased, although insignificantly.
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CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT OF WELFARE REFORM ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
A. Introduction
The federal welfare program Assistance to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
was the main financial support to single-parent families for many years. Poor single
mothers with children were the most common beneficiaries of this program. Two-
parent families who satisfied certain requirements were qualified for a separate welfare
program entitled Assistance to Families with Dependent Children with Unemployed
Parents (AFDC-UP). The objective of these programs was helping poor families over-
come transitory economic hardship. Nevertheless, the opponents to these programs
claimed that the AFDC regime discouraged marriage and eventually raised many
social and family-related problems such as the increase in teen motherhood, out-of-
wedlock birth, and others.
In 1996 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) replaced AFDC with the Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) pro-
gram. TANF introduced several new rules and policies which dramatically changed
the incentives for potential welfare recipients. During 1992–1997, prior to the imple-
mentation of TANF, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) granted
several AFDC waivers to a number of states to test a variety of welfare reform strate-
gies. Thirty-one out of fifty-one states were authorized to set up their own experimen-
tal programs with different welfare policies such as time limits, work requirements,
increased earnings disregards, etc. After these experiments, some of the waivers were
integrated into the official TANF which all states must comply with. A fundamen-
tal guideline of TANF is attempting to lead its beneficiaries to be economically self
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sufficient. Block grant funding is allocated to each state in order to find the most
suitable manner to help beneficiaries reach this objective given the circumstances of
the state.
In principle, the changes in the welfare reform cause both mechanical and be-
havioral effects on individual decisions about family formation. For example, the
implications of time limits and work requirements make TANF less attractive. The
degree of welfare aggressiveness, i.e., lenient benefit generosity, strict time limits,
high earnings disregards, or strict work requirements, varies across states and time
as states set up their own programs. These restrictive welfare rules lead to a sub-
stantial reduction in welfare use. In response to the new welfare regime, individuals
re-optimize their fertility, marriage, welfare-use, and work decisions mechanically and
behaviorally. The mechanical effects refers to the eligibility restriction. There are
two types of mechanical effects on the marriage and divorce decisions; i.e., AFDC-UP
availability and time limits. Living in a state which does not provide AFDC-UP, a
single mother is less likely to be married as she will lose her entitlement to the welfare
benefit. Time limits allow an individual to receive welfare for at most 60 months.
Welfare becomes unavailable to a recipient after she exhausts the time limits. Behav-
ioral effects refer to the variations in individual decisions arising from the changes in
the optimal choices in response to the new rules of the welfare programs.
While many papers attempt to assess the impact of the TANF regulations of each
state on marriage, only a few studies (for example, Bitler et al. (2004)) have done this
using post welfare-reform and nation-level data. There is a handful of papers either
simulating the post-reform data to predict the effect of the reform on individual
behavior (for example, Swann (2005)) or investigating the reform effect in specific
state-wide programs (for example, Gennetian and Miller (2004)). Policy simulations
of the AFDC in Swann (2005) suggest that the new elements of welfare reform such
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as time limits and work requirements prolong the marriage spell. Gennetian and
Miller (2004) found that the welfare experiment in Minnesota increased marriage
rates among single parent long-term recipients and increased marital stability among
two-parent recipient families. However, using state-level marriage and divorce rates
from the Vital Statistics, Bitler et al. (2004) found that TANF and waivers decreased
both marriage and divorce.
In this paper I use micro data to assess the effect of welfare reform on marriage
and divorce among women. My results complement those found by Bitler et al.
(2004)). Since Bitler et al. (2004) study is limited to only marriages and divorces of
the whole population, it does not provide an analysis of the family formation decisions
of disadvantaged women who are most likely to be affected by the reform. I provide a
fairly simple static model of individual choice including welfare and family formation
decisions in order to obtain a number of hypotheses which can be contrasted with
the data. I measure marriage and divorce likelihood by using a flow into and out of
marriage. I match individuals in the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from
1988 to 2002, covering the pre- and post-reform periods, and observe their changes
in marital status. The different welfare policies adopted by the different states allow
me to identify the effect of each major welfare policy. Similarly, I use cross-state
variation in the timing that the welfare reform was adopted to identify the overall
effect of welfare reform.
Using probit estimations, I find that the welfare reform decreased marriage; how-
ever, it had no effect on divorce. The result is driven by a strong negative effect of
work incentives on family formation. The difference-in-difference models allow for
an analysis of the impact of welfare reform on disadvantaged women. Among dis-
advantaged women, I find that the welfare reform had a negative effect on marriage
but did not significantly affect divorce. The mechanical effect of AFDC-UP program
31
strongly impacts marriage and divorce as predicted. Interestingly, I find that the
aggressiveness of welfare reform had a positive effect on marriage. Marriage becomes
more attractive when the welfare is more intricate to obtain. The results are robust
when control for the individual characteristics. These empirical observations are con-
sistent with the predictions of the theoretical model described in this paper. Overall,
these results provide a detailed explanation of the mechanisms behind the effect of
the reform on marriage.
B. Literature Review
In the last decade, a number of papers have analyzed the impact of welfare reform on
many different aspects: labor market, out-of-wedlock and teen births, the marriage
rate, female headship, etc. In this section, I highlight the main contributions and
show how the results in this paper contribute to this line of research.
Swann (2005) proposed a structural model to analyze the decisions related to the
optimal duration of employment, welfare use, and mariage spells. Using the PSID
dataset1 in which all employment, welfare use, and marriage spells are observed, he
can predict the changes in behavior and time spent in each state given a change in
any component of the AFDC program; i.e., cash benefits, benefit reduction rates,
time limits, and work trigger. His results suggest that marriage spells, regardless
of employment status, increase due to the effect of time limits. Also, work trigger
leads women to stay married longer. A decrease in benefit reduction rates, however,
shortens marriage spells. These results suggest that womens marriage decision is
affected by welfare policy changes.
1His sample contains women when they finish school or establish their own house-
hold, and they leave the sample either when they leave the PSID through attrition
or in 1992 prior to the welfare reform.
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Blackburn (2000) hypothesizes that generous welfare benefits lead to fewer mar-
riages and less work among single mothers. Therefore, the AFDC program would
have lead to an increase in the percentage of families headed by unmarried women.
Marriage is less likely when welfare benefits are high because receiving welfare income
is contingent on being unmarried. Applying the hazard rate model on the NLSY79
data set, he found that higher welfare payments lower the probability of being married
among non-black, never married mothers; whereas they are associated with a higher
probability of being married for black, never married mothers.
Moffitt (1990) uses cross-sectional data to investigate the effect of the AFDC
program on marital status of both men and women. The empirical results show weak
correlations. However, the magnitude and significance have grown over time. In
addition, correlations for men are stronger than those for women. Overall these results
suggest that the generous benefits of the welfare program decrease the incentives to
be married.
Klerman and Haider (2004) provide an alternative method to estimate the im-
pact of economic conditions on welfare caseload by focusing in a flow measure of
program beneficiaries. They study the data of California and find that an estimate is
appreciably larger than that obtained from static stock measure. Bitler et al. (2004)
apply a similar procedure by obtaining marriage rates at state-level from the Vital
Statistics. They find that the welfare reform has led to lower divorce and marriage
rates in relation to the whole population. However, a more meaningful measure of
marriage rates should consider only the people who are potentially marriageable and
not the whole population. A similar argument applies to the measure of divorce rates.
In addition, as suggested by Moffitt (1990), men and women may respond differently
to the change in the welfare reform. Since the Detailed Vital Statistics, which record
all marriages and divorces by demographic variables, are available only until 1995,
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this study cannot measure the effect of the reform for different groups of interest such
as low-income women. The welfare reform should strongly affect low-income women
with dependent children, therefore, it is worthwhile to focus on the effect of welfare
reform on the groups which are most likely to be affected by it.
C. Contribution
By matching individuals across two consecutive years in the March CPS data, I
obtain marriage rates from the change in the marital status of the matched sample.
In addition to the traditional matching, I introduce a new procedure, namely converse
matching, which allows me to identify women who change marital status and address
at the same time. Women who change their address as they get married are not in
the same household in two consecutive years; therefore, they cannot be matched. In
order to take into account these women among those who change their marital status,
I observe men who appear in two consecutive years whose marital status changes from
“unmarried” in t − 1 to “married” in t. If their newlywed wives just move into the
sampled households in t, then I consider these women as a match whose marital status
changes from “unmarried” in t − 1 to “married” in t (see more details in section 1)
and collect their information. I obtain divorce rates in a similar fashion.
The welfare reform is a change in government policy which affects the whole
nation. However, the disadvantaged group such as low-income women is most likely
to be affected by it. In contrast to state-level total marriage and divorce rates of the
whole population used in Bitler et al. (2004), using a micro-level data set consist-
ing of individual- and family-level characteristics allows for cross-group comparisons.
Therefore the Difference-in-Difference approach is possible. The effect of the reform is
identifiable from the cross-state variation in the time when the welfare reform, either
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waiver or TANF, whichever comes first, was adopted.
TANF incorporates many new components; i.e., time limit, work requirement,
and eligibility for two-parent family. These changes may affect marriage decision
differently. In the section E I analyze a utility maximization model. Even though I
do not assume a specific utility function, the model provides sharp predictions about
the static response to changes in different welfare components.
One of the most important aspects of the welfare reform is work encourage-
ment. Work incentives play an important role in marriage decision among women.
Nevertheless, the sign of this effect may be ambiguous. If the self-sufficiency effect
dominates the effect of increased marriageability in the mating market, then strong
work incentives should have a negative impact on new marriages and vice versa. In
order to identify the effect of work incentives, I use the index proposed by Blank
and Schmidt (2001). This index has three categories, weak, mixed, and strong; and
measures the degree of benefit generosity, earnings disregards, work sanction, and
time limit across states and years. In addition to work incentives, I define the degree
of welfare aggressiveness which measures the level of welfare generosity in terms of
high cash benefit, lenient time limit, lenient work sanction, and high earned income
disregard. More details are available in section 3.
D. Objectives and Hypothesis
First, in this paper I investigate the overall effect of the welfare reform on the flow of
women into and out of marriage. Second, I estimate the effect of welfare reform com-
ponents on marriage and divorce decisions. The identification comes from cross-state
variation in policy parameters. Due to the flexibility in implementing the welfare
reform and the fact that each state could implement its own welfare program (within
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some general restrictions), there are many differences in welfare policies across states
and time. The welfare policy affects marriage decisions not only among women but
also among men (Moffitt (1990)). In order to quantify the change in marriage de-
cisions during 1989-2002, I construct a variable which measures marriage rates as a
flow. These flow variables, marriage and divorce rates, are more appropriate than
the proportion of marriage, for detecting an immediate impact of the welfare reform
(Klerman and Haider (2004); Bitler et al. (2004)).
The overall effect of welfare reform on marriage and divorce decisions is ambigous
as it operates through many channels:% through many channels.
1. Mechanical effect: The reformed AFDC-UP program, and its less restrictive
rules for married couples, encouraged welfare recipients to combine welfare and
marriage. This should have a positive effect on marriage rates.
2. Behavioral effect:
• Work-incentive rules such as work requirement and the increase in earned
income disregard may have an ambiguous effect on marriage. Once a
woman works, a greater pool of potential mates is accessible through the
workplace. The increase in supply of potential mates results in a higher
probability of matching in the marriage market. However, a self-sufficiency
effect may also occur when a working woman becomes financially indepen-
dent. Blau and Kahn (2000) found that, as a result of the decline in the
gender wage gap, the comparative advantage of wives at home has declined,
driving an increased share of men into home production and reducing the
value of specialization within marriage. The self sufficiency effect therefore
has a negative (positive) impact on marriage (divorce) decisions.
• Aggressiveness of the welfare policy such as low benefit levels, strict time
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limits, and strong work-related rules may turn marriage into a more at-
tractive alternative than it was before the reform. A woman with large
disutility parameter from mandatory working and less generous benefits
may find in marriage a more attractive alternative. It is also possible
that the restrictive welfare program discourages potential welfare recipi-
ents from receiving welfare and encourages them to acquire more education
and delay marriage.
I also construct a static model of individual maximization to identify the rela-
tionship between welfare parameters and marriage gain. The main objective is to
make predictions which disentangle the effects of several family-formation related el-
ements of the new welfare reform. The comparative static analysis described in the
next section yields several testable hypotheses regarding the effects of each welfare
component over the marriage gains. In particular (1) the maximum cash benefit has
a negative effect; (2) earnings disregards has a negative effect; (3) work requirement
has a positive effect; and (4) Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansion has an
ambiguous effect.
E. Theory
In this section I set up a model to examine the relationship between changes in dif-
ferent policy parameters and family formation decisions. The analysis focuses on
the utility maximization problem solved by women who simultaneously make deci-
sions about family formation and welfare use. Solving this problem aims to analyze
the marriage gain in response to the changes in the major components of welfare
reform. These changes relate to maximum benefit levels, earned income disregards,
and work requirements among others. Any female eligible for welfare benefits solves
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the following utility maximization problem.
MAXhf ,C,T,MU(hf , C, T,M) = U(hf , C)− δT + ηM
subject to
C = (1−M)wf (1− τ)hf +M(1− τ)(wfhf + wmhm)e
−γ
+ T (1−M)BS + TMBMe−γ +N
BS = G− (N + t(wf(hf + h
r)−E))
BM = G− (N + t(wf(hf + h
r) + wmhm −E))
The Lagrangian can be written as
L = U(hf , C)− δT + ηM − λ[C − (1−M)wf (1− τ)hf
−M(1− τ)(wfhf + wmhm)e
−γ −N − T (1−M)BS − TMBMe−γ ]
All prices are normalized to Pc where
C is a consumption good
hf is female’s hours worked
hr is additional hours worked required by welfare
M is marital status, M = 1 if married and M = 0 otherwise
T is welfare status, T = 1 if on welfare and T = 0 otherwise
δ is stigma effect.
η is a parameter measuring preference for marriage.
hm is given male’s hours worked.
wf is female’s wage rate.
wm is male’s hours worked.
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τ is earned income tax rate or positive earned income tax credit(EITC)
e−γ is female’s bargaining power on couple’s earned income
N is non-labor income
BS is the welfare benefit for single women
BM is the welfare benefit for married couples
t is the benefit reduction rate (BRR) or negative income tax
G is the maximum welfare benefit
Four choice variables, hours worked (hf ), consumption good (C), marital status
(M), and welfare receipt (T ), are chosen. Hours worked and consumption are contin-
uous variables whereas marital status and welfare use are binary variables. To solve
this problem, I hold M and T constant and solve for the optimal solution of {h∗f , C
∗}
at each marital and welfare status. In sum, there are 4 states for consideration; i.e.,
single and no welfare use (M = 0, T = 0), single and welfare use (M = 0, T = 1), mar-
ried and no welfare use (M = 1, T = 0), and married and welfare use (M = 1, T = 1).
Then women choose the state at which her utility is maximized.
T=0 T=1
M=0 U1(h∗00, C
∗
00) U
2(h∗01, C
∗
01)
M=1 U3(h∗10, C
∗
10) U
4(h∗11, C
∗
11)
For example, a woman will choose to be in the state 1 (single and no welfare use),
and correspondingly {h∗f , C
∗} if U1(h∗00, C
∗
00) is greater than U
2(h∗01, C
∗
01), U
3(h∗10, C
∗
10),
and U4(h∗11, C
∗
11).
The first-order conditions impose the optimal choices of h∗f and C
∗ to satisfy
−U1
U2
= wf [(1−M) +M(1 +
wm
wf
hm)e
−γ − T (1−M)ts − TMtm].
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Specifically, assuming an interior solution, I obtain
−U1
U2
= wf [1− τ ]
−U1
U2
= wf [1− τ ][(1 +
wm
wf
hm)e
−γ ]
−U1
U2
= wf [1− t]
−U1
U2
= wf [1− t][(1 +
wm
wf
hm)e
−γ − t]
for {M,T} = {0, 0}, {M,T} = {1, 0}, {M,T} = {0, 1}, and {M,T} = {1, 1}
respectively. As a result, optimal solutions for h∗f , C
∗,M∗, T ∗ are functions of the
exogenous variables, including welfare parameters:
C∗ = dc(wf , wmhm, e
−γ , δ, η, N,G, t, E,G, t)
h∗f = sh(wf , wmhm, e
−γ, δ, η, N,G, t, E,G, t)
M∗ = dM(wf , wmhm, e
−γ, δ, η, N,G, t, E,G, t)
T ∗ = dT (wf , wmhm, e
−γ, δ, η, N,G, t, E,G, t).
Here dc is the demand for the consumption good, sh is the supply of labor, dM
is the demand for marriage, and dT is the demand for welfare assistance. Let VMT be
the utility of a woman with marital status M ∈ {single, married} and welfare status
T ∈ {off welfare, on welfare}. The optimal utility functions for each state are given
by
V00 = V00(c00, 1− h00, wf [1− τ ])
V10 = V10(c10, 1− h10, wf [1− τ ][(1 +
wm
wf
hm)e
−γ ], η)
V01 = V01(c01, 1− h01, wf [1− t], G, E,−δ)
V11 = V11(c11, 1− h11, wf [1− t][(1 +
wm
wf
hm)e
−γ − t], G, E,−δ, η).
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The expected utility gained by getting married, denoted by F , is given by the
difference between the expected utility obtained from being married and the expected
utility obtained from not being married. Therefore
F = E[V10, V11]− E[V00, V01]
= [pV10 − (1− p)V11]− [qV00 + (1− q)V01],
where p is the probability of receiving welfare conditional on being married and
q is the probability of receiving welfare conditional on being single.
A standard comparative static exercise allows me to analyze the effects of changes
in policy parameters on the expected gained from getting married. Let V (z) be
the indirect utility function of the maximization problem where z represents policy
parameters:
V (z) = maxC,hfU(C, hf ; z).
Using the Lagrange-Envelope theorem (for example, see Simon and Blume (1994)),
the total derivative of the indirect utility is just the partial derivative of the La-
grangian with respect to the change in the corresponding policy parameter, i.e.,
d
dz
V (C∗(z), h∗f (z); z) =
∂L
∂z
(C∗(z), h∗f (z), λ(z); z).
where L is the lagrangian function and λ(z) ≥ 0 is the lagrange multiplier. In
particular,
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1. The effect of a change in the maximum benefit generosity, G, is given by
dF
dG
=
∂([pV10 + (1− p)V11]− [qV00 + (1− q)V01])
∂G
=
∂(1− p)V11
∂G
−
∂(1− q)V01
∂G
= (1− p)λe−γ − (1− q)λ
= λ[(1− p)e−γ − (1− q)]
< 0. (3.1)
dF
dG
is negative because the proportion of welfare recipients who are married,
1− p, is less than the proportion of welfare recipients who are single, 1− q2. In
addition, e−γ ∈ [0, 1]; as a result, the change in the maximum benefit generosity,
G, has a negative effect on the expected utility gained by getting married.
2. The effect of a change in the earned income disregard, E, is given by
dF
dE
=
∂([pV10 + (1− p)V11]− [qV00 + (1− q)V01])
∂E
=
∂(1− p)V11
∂E
−
∂(1− q)V01
∂E
= (1− p)λe−γ − (1− q)λ
= λ[(1− p)e−γ − (1− q)]
< 0.
Therefore, a change in the earnings disregards, E, has a negative effect on the
expected utility gained by getting married.
2Only 1.76 percents of all married women aged 15-44 is on welfare where as 8.84
percents of all single women aged 15-44 is on welfare (Source: March CPS 1988b-
2002).
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3. The effect of a change in the work requirement, hr, is given by
dF
dhr
=
∂([pV10 + (1− p)V11]− [qV00 + (1− q)V01])
∂hr
=
∂(1− p)V11
∂hr
−
∂(1− q)V01
∂hr
= (1− p)λ(−twf )e
−γ − (1− q)λ(−twf)
= −λtwf [(1− p)e
−γ − (1− q)]
> 0
A change in the work requirement, hr, has a positive effect on the expected
utility gained by getting married.
4. The effect of a change in the positive Earned Income Tax Credit, τ , is given by
dF
dτ
=
∂([pV10 + (1− p)V11]− [qV00 + (1− q)V01])
∂τ
=
∂[pV10 + (1− p)V11]
∂τ
−
∂[qV00 + (1− q)V01]
∂τ
= −pλwfhfe
−γ − (1− p)λwf(hf + h
r)e−γ − qλwfhf − (1− q)λwf(hf + h
r)
= λwf [(hf + h
re−γ) + phre−γ − (hf + h
r) + qhr]
= λwfh
r(e−γ(1 + p) + q − 1)
> 0.
For simplicity, I assume e−γ = 1 which means all of husband income goes into
the budget constraint as a non-labor income, then dF
dhr
> 0. As a result, the
expansion in the Earned Income Tax Credit should raise the expected utility
gained by getting married.
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5. The effect of a change in the AFDC-UP availability, 1− p, is given by
dF
dp
=
∂([pV10 + (1− p)V11]− [qV00 + (1− q)V01])
∂p
=
∂pV10
∂p
+
∂(1− p)V11
∂p
= V10 − V11
< 0
dF
d(1− p)
=
dF
dp
∗
dp
d(1− p)
> 0.
Assuming a utility if married and receive welfare (V11) is greater than a utility
if married and receive no welfare (V10). As a result, the mechanical effect of
AFDC-UP availability has a positive effect on the expected utility gained by
getting married.
6. The effect of a change in the welfare restriction, (δ), is given by
dF
dδ
=
∂([pV10 + (1− p)V11]− [qV00 + (1− q)V01])
∂δ
=
∂(1− p)V11
∂δ
−
∂(1− q)V01
∂δ
= −(1− p) + (1− q)
> 0.
An aggressive welfare rule with the strict time limits, low benefit generosity,
strong work sanction, and low earned income disregard implies a stronger degree
of stigma as denoted by an increase in δ. Theoretical comparative static analysis
concludes that an aggressive welfare rule should increase the marriage gain.
These theoretical results yield testable hypotheses. Empirically, higher marriage
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gains lead to a higher probability that a woman gets married. The following sec-
tions describe the data and empirical methodology used to test the aforementioned
hypotheses.
F. Data
There are two sets of data required for this analysis, i.e., individual-level and welfare
policy data.
1. Individual-level Data: March Current Population Survey
I construct a flow measure of marriage rate obtained from micro data. I match in-
dividuals from the cross-sectional March CPS 1988B-20023 across two consecutive
years. The advantage of CPS data is that its sample size swamps all alternative
sources of panel data and the rotating design guarantees continual refreshing. The
alternative data sets such as PSID, NLSY, and SIPP embody individual fixed effect
and are not nationally representative for each other year. Monthly, CPS interviews
approximately 130,000-160,000 individuals. There are 8 rotation groups. Each rota-
tion is interviewed for 4 consecutive months and discontinued for the next 8 months
and re-interviewed again for the following 4 consecutive months before it is removed
from the sample. Therefore in the CPS data, I can identify an individual who has
been sampled in two consecutive years if he/she lives in the same housing unit in
March of year t − 1 and March of year t4. The sample with month-in-survey 1-4 in
3In 1989 the Census bureau changed the way data was processed, cleaned, and
edited. Some variable definitions changed, new variables (census recodes) appeared,
and others disappeared. Thus, the Census took the raw 1988 data, processed it using
the 1989 techniques and released it as a Bridge file, 1988B.
4As in most of the literature, I choose March to match the individuals from one
year to the next.
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year t−1 is matched with the sample with month-in-survey 5-8 in year t, respectively.
An individual sample is recorded as a match if (s)he lives in the same household
with the same line number, gender, race, and age ( see Madrian and Lefgren (1999)).
I allow some variations in person’s age in this matching process5. I also record sample
of women who did not appear in year t − 1 but then appear as they move into the
sampled households in year t due to new marriages to the matched men. I call this
procedure converse matching. I record changes in marital status of matched men and
then collect their spouse information even if she appears only in the second period.
Her change in marital status is inferred from the matched spouse’s. Similarly, I can
observe matched men who get divorced. If their ex wives remained in the household in
year t−1 prior to the divorce and move out in year t, then these women are recorded
as a matched sample whose marital status changes from “married” to “divorce”. This
procedure yields a unique matched CPS data. Welch (1993) matched the March CPS
from 1979 through 1991 files using two stages. The sampled was matched in the
first stage according to a traditional matching. Those remaining unmatched were
then matched without reference to the line number. I did not use Welch (1993)
second step in matching, rather I matched more samples using the converse matching
procedure. Though, my matching rate is similar and com- parable to Welch (1993).
The matching rates for whites and blacks by age are provided in figures 2 and 3.
The matching rate shown is a combined matching rate in the first and second year
in sample6. The matching rate for young female is relatively lower than the older
5It is possible that a person ages 0-2 years from the interview in the previous
March.
6For example, the matching rate in 1989 is a percentage of the matched sample in
month-in-survey 1 to 4 in 1989 that were matched with the sample in month-in-survey
5 to 8 in 1990 and a matched sample in month-in-survey 5 to 8 in 1989 that were
matched with the sample in month-in-survey 1 to 4 in 1988.
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counterpart as their mobility is higher. Conditioning on the age, the matching rate
for both blacks and whites are roughly constant throughout the sampling period. In
addition, figure 4 illustrates the comparison in proportion of women who are married
between full-sample March CPS and matched-sample March CPS. The proportion of
married women from matched sample is slightly higher than that of full sample except
for women aged 15-23. The pattern of proportion of married women is consistent
between full sample and matched sample from March CPS in each age group. As a
result, the selection bias in matching procedure does not arise.
One might argue that the sample from matching the March CPS left out many
new marriages as women move out when they are married. Figure 5 compares the
marriage rate of unmarried women aged 15-44 between the Vital Statistics7 and the
matched March CPS sample. The dot lines represent the standard error interval
constructed from a binomial distribution. It shows that the marriage rates obtained
from the Vital Statistics and the matched March CPS are similar. On average,
the marriage rate per 1000 population from the matched March CPS is higher than
that from the Vital Statistics as depicted in figure 5. This evidence suggests that the
unmatched sample in the CPS are more concentrated on the ones who move out of the
sampled households due to the non-marriage reason such as employment or education
rather than being married. There are some explanations behind this findings. First,
there is an increasing trend in pre-marital cohabitation (see Stevenson and Wolfers
(2007)), therefore, people are unlikely to move out when they are married. Second,
as the average age of the population getting married is high, they are more stable
and settled down than the younger ones.
According to my unique method of matching the March CPS, the only new
7The Detailed Vital Statistics are available until 1995, see Chadwick and Heaton
(1999).
47
marriages that would be missing out are newlywed couples who both move out to
the new residences. In addition, Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) found a strongly
positive trend of cohabitation prior to the marriage. This stylized fact should cause
the marriage-moving-out sample to become less concern. CPS data suggests that
cohabitation rates among adults have risen from 2.9 percent in March 1995 to 4.7
percent in March 2005. Among those entering first marriages in the early 2000s, 59
percent had cohabited with their future spouse prior to marriage. The 2002 National
Survey of Family Growth found that 50 percent of women aged 15 to 44 had cohabited
at some point. Prior to marriage, couples were cohabiting and are likely to remain in
the same household after marriage. As a result, the matched CPS sample is a proper
micro-level data set for marriage and welfare reform analysis.
I construct the flow into marriage from each year (March to March) by observing
a change in a marital status from not married it year t − 1 to married in year t. I
construct the flow out of marriage, or the flow into divorce, in a similar fashion. In
terms of willingness to leave marriage, widowers are different from divorcees so the
new widowers in year t are coded as being married.
2. Policy Data
The data of cross-state welfare policy and implementation year is collected from the
State Policy Documentation Project (SPDP) and the green book. Figure 1 illustrates
the time variation in welfare reform implementation year across states. California,
Michigan, and New Jersey are the first pioneers that adopted waiver in 1992. Twenty-
five states implemented TANF in 1996 calendar year. Other twenty-five states im-
plemented TANF in the following year. California was the last and only state that
implemented TANF in the early 1998.
In addition, there are other marriage-related laws such as unilateral(no-fault)
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divorce laws and covenant marriage laws8 enacted by different states at different
points in time. Most states switched laws from mutual consent to unilateral or no-
fault divorce between 1970-1985 prior to my analysis. Only twenty out of fifty-one
states still have mutual divorce laws. Optional covenant marriage laws in which
the marrying couple agree to obtain pre-marital counseling and accept more limited
grounds for divorce is legal in only 3 states; i.e, Louisiana(1997), Arizona(1998) and
Arkansas(2001).
Tables IX and X report the pre- and post-reform sample means of demographic as
well as the welfare policies variables of unmarried women aged 15-44 from the matched
March CPS 1988B-2002. In general, women’s characteristics such as a proportion of
women with children, a fertility rate, a proportion of blacks, and a mean of age are
virtually similar before and after welfare reform implementation. The average age of
women in the sample is 26 years old. The share of hispanics, however, significantly
increases after the reform. The labor force participation rate (LFPR) is slightly
higher. By comparison, the stylized fact shows a dramatically decrease in a proportion
of welfare recipients and a maximum cash benefit after the reform. A flow into
marriage significantly drops during the post reform. Of every 100 unmarried women
aged 15-44, eight new marriages occurred prior to the reform and it decreased into
only six new marriages after the reform.
A sample mean of the divorce shown in tables XI and XII reports a marginal
increase during the post reform. A proportion of women with children, age of children,
a proportion of blacks, and a mean of age are comparable the same before and after
the welfare reform. The labor force participation among married women is higher
8It is more difficult for couples who have a legal covenant marriage to obtain a
divorce. Cause for divorce is typically limited to abuse, a felony with jail time, or
adultery.
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than unmarried women and it remains roughly constant over the course of 1988 to
2002.
Figure 6 represents the marriage rate of women aged 15-44 from the matched
March CPS during 1989 to 2002 by redefining a traditional calendar year to the
number of years since the welfare reform was implemented9, that is, year “0” is the
year that the welfare reform initially sets in, year “1” is one year after the reform-
implementation year, year “-1” is one year prior to the welfare reform implementation
and so on. Even though different states adopted waivers or TANF in different calendar
years (as summarized in figure 1), this technique puts all states into the reform-
implementation year dimension instead. Figure 6 and 7 illustrate the number of
marriages and divorces per 1,000 at-risk women aged 15-44 from matched March
CPS 1988B-2002 with time dimension redefined to years since the welfare reform was
implemented. On average, the post-reform marriage rate is considerably lower than
pre-reform. Figure 8 also shows the marriage rate by age group and by race. The
different demographic groups may respond to the reform differently. There is no clear
evidence from figure 8 suggesting that the welfare reform affect women’s marriage
differently according to their ages. White women, compared with other races, show
a significant drop in marriage after the reform as illustrated in figure 9.
Another nationwide poverty-relief federal policy, the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), expanded during the sample period. The EITC began in 1975 to offset
the social security payroll tax for working-poor families. It has been reformed three
times in 1986, 1990 and 1993 and has grown to become the largest cash-transfer
program. The EITC expansion in 1990 and 1993 was a result of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Acts(OBRA). The tax reform expanded EITC only to families with
9When either a waiver or TANF is adopted, whichever comes first.
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positive incomes. EITC transfers cash to the poor while also creating incentives to
work (Eissa and Liebman (1996)) which may indirectly affect the marriage rate. Prior
to 1994, only working families with children were eligible for the EITC. During 1983-
1990, working families with two or more children had the same EITC parameters10 as
families with only one child. Since both the EITC expansion and the welfare reform
occurred in the same period of analysis, I have to control for the EITC expansion
effect. I construct an indicator of EITC expansion to capture the average OBRA
effect. EITC expansion is in effect if families have either at least one child during
1991-2001 or no child during 1994-2001. The estimate of the EITC expansion can be
interpreted as the average OBRA effect compared with the prior EITC program on
woman’s marriage decision.
G. Econometric Framework
1. Overall Welfare Reform Effect: Probit Model
The probit models of the flow into and out of marriage are given as following.
Pr(Mi,s,t = 0→ Mi,s,t+1 = 1)t = φ(Xist, Eist,WRst, Lst, Vs, Yt, εist) (3.2)
Pr(Mi,s,t = 1→ Mi,s,t+1 = 0)t = φ(Xist, Eist,WRst, Lst, Vs, Yt, ist) (3.3)
where the regressand takes value 0 if the statement inside the parenthesis is false,
or 1 if it is true for the at-risk women. For example, it equals one if an individual i
lives in state s changes her marital status from not married in t to married in t+1 and
equals zero if she is not married in t and remains unmarried in t + 1. Demographic
covariates of individual i in state s and in year t is represented by Xist. I also consider
10These are marginal tax rates including phase-in and phase-out, maximum credit,
etc.
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EITC expansion during the sampling period and it is represented by dummy variable
Eist. Eist is an average EITC expansion depending on the family-child structure.
Families with any positive number of children were EITC qualified with the same
rules before 1991. After 1991, the EITC rules applied to families with one child
are different from the ones with two or more children. Families without any children
began to be eligible for EITC in 1994. As a result, I define Eist equals to 1 if a woman
has either any dependent child during 1991-2002 or no child during 1994-2002. I also
include state welfare benefit generosity which consists of AFDC/TANF cash benefit
for a family of three, food stamp, and medicaid as well as state-level labor market
variable; e.g, unemployment rate, lagged state unemployment in variable Lst. State
and year fixed effects are denoted by Vs and Yt respectively. The rest of unobservable
determinants are captured in the error terms, εist and ist.
The key variable is the welfare reform indicator, WRst. WRst is the fraction
of year t11 that major AFDC waiver (or TANF) is effective in state s. If state s
implements the AFDC waiver in year t, WRst equals to a fraction of year t and
becomes 1 thereafter. If state never implemented the AFDC waiver, then WRst
equals to a fraction of year t that such state adopts TANF. This dummy specification
is derived from the assumption that the reform has an immediate impact on the
marriage rate and its effect is constant over the post-reform period and across states.
The welfare-reform coefficients, therefore, obtained from this estimation should be
interpreted as an average of welfare reform effects for both waiver and TANF over the
post-reform period. The welfare reform dummy, however, are defined differently from
the ones specified in Bitler et al. (2004). Their waiver and TANF welfare dummies are
fractions of the year that welfare reforms(waiver or TANF) were initially implemented.
11year t starts from March in year t for consistency with March CPS data.
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Then, those dummies turn back to zero in the subsequent years. In addition, they
estimate waiver and TANF effects separately. Their model suggests that they assume
welfare reform has an instantaneous effect on marriage rate only in the first year but
not thereafter. My model allows welfare reform to have a roughly constant effect on
the marriage rate throughout the post-welfare reform period available in my data.
2. Overall Welfare Reform Effect: Difference-in-Difference Model
If the marriage rate follows some welfare-unrelated within-state trend that coincides
with the period of welfare reform, the welfare effect estimation will be inconclusive.
In addition, welfare reform, theoretically, should impose a stronger effect on a target
group of poor single women with children than its counterpart due to the fact that
only wealth-qualified families with children are eligible for the welfare. Identifying
any single women with dependent children as a treatment group is inappropriate
because it also includes those who are unlikely to be affected by the reform. To
address this potential problem, I use a Difference-in-Difference approach(DD). I use
qualified children, education level, and family income to construct treatment and
control groups. The proposed treatment and control groups are valid under the
assumption that fertility is exogenous. The sample means of probability that a woman
has an infant in tables IX and X are virtually equal. I perform a mean comparison
test between pre- and post-reform fertility rate and I cannot reject that they have
the same mean. This suggests that the fertility rate was not affected by the welfare
reform and it was exogenous.
The Difference-in-Difference approach also controls for any contemporaneous
shocks to the overall marriage market over time. It is worth noting that the DD
estimation yields consistent estimates if (1) there are no contemporaneous shocks
(other than welfare reform) to the relative marriage market outcome of both treat-
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ment and control groups and (2) there are no underlying marriage trends that differ
between the treatment and control groups. I define unmarried women aged 15-44
with less than 18 year-old dependent children as a treatment group. Two comparison
groups are unmarried women aged 15-44 with no dependent child or with children
aged 18 and over.
For further confidence in the DD estimation, I define 3 different treatment groups
with their counterpart control groups. I propose 2 control groups associated with
each treatment group to ensure that what I am estimating is the actual effect of
welfare reform and not simply the effect of other contemporaneous changes or trend
differences between the control and treatment groups. I categorize each woman,
depending on her characteristics, into the groups below.
Group 1
Treatment Group With child & High school dropout
Control Group 1 No child & High school dropout
Control Group 2 With child & High school degree or higher
Group 2
Treatment Group With child & Family income ≤ 5 pct
Control Group 1 No child & Family income ≤ 5 pct
Control Group 2 With child & Family income ≥ 50 pct
Group 3
Treatment Group With child & Family income ≤ 10 pct
Control Group 1 No child & Family income ≤ 10 pct
Control Group 2 With child & Family income ≥ 50 pct
The welfare reform effect is then estimable from a linear probability regression as
expressed in the following equation.
54
ˆ1ist(Married) = αˆ0 + αˆ11ist(Treat) + αˆ21ist(Control1) + αˆ3Reformst
+ αˆ41ist(Control1) ∗Reformst + αˆ51ist(Control1) ∗Reformst (3.4)
where 1ist(Married) is an indicator variable; it equals to one if a woman is not
married in t and becomes married in t + 1, zero if a woman is not married in both
t and t + 1. 1ist(Treat) or 1ist(Control1) equals to one if a woman is categorized as
a treatment group or control group 1 and zero otherwise. The Reform variable is a
share of year that the welfare reform is in the effect.
The DD estimate for the divorce probability is modeled in the similar fashion by
simply changing the dependent variable from “being married” to “being divorce”12.
The estimates in table XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, and XXVII are derived from
the linear combination of the coefficients estimated from equation 3.4 as illustrated
in table XXVIII.
3. The Effect of Welfare Reform Components
As the reform introduced many new features into the welfare program, it is worthwhile
to assess the effect of the reform components on family structure. It is practical and
useful for the policy makers to develop strategies based on the findings in this setup
to achieve the prospective outcomes.
States are allowed to set up their own policies following TANF guidelines. They
vary in terms of the degree of work incentive and welfare restriction. Source of iden-
tification for welfare-reform components comes from the fact that states differently
applied and adjusted welfare component at different points in time. I model the wel-
12Dependent variable takes value one if a woman is married in t and divorce in
t+ 1; zero if a women is married in both t and t+ 1.
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fare reform components effects on the probability of new marriage and new divorce
as the following probit equations.
Pr(Mi,s,t = 0→Mi,s,t+1 = 1)t = φ(Xist,Wst, Tst, Ist, Lst, Vs, ωist)
Pr(Mi,s,t = 1→Mi,s,t+1 = 0)t = φ(Xist,Wst, Tst, Ist, Lst, Vs, ψist)
The notation is the same as in equations 3.2 and 3.3. The vector of the compo-
nents of welfare reform is Ist. I assume a constant effect of the the components of
welfare reform across states and throughout the period in which those components
are effective. I adopt a methodology proposed by Blank and Schmidt (2001) to rank
the degree for each component and work incentives. In addition, I apply similar con-
cept to identify the degree of welfare aggressiveness. Construction methodologies are
available in appendix.
4. Validity of Cross-State Variation in Welfare Reform
Since the estimation of the welfare reform effect in this paper is identifiable from
the cross-state variation in time of welfare reform implementation, it is critical that
timing of adopting reform does not correlate to the prior marriage and divorce rates. If
timing of reform adoption systematically correlates to pre-reform marriage rate, then
the results from cross-state variation method will not represent the welfare reform
effect, instead, it illustrates the marriage pattern consistent with state marriage trend.
As a result, I perform a validity test to check whether timing of reform adoption
systematically correlates to the prior marriage rate.
I construct a variable representing timing of reform adoption as a number of
years since September 1992 when New Jersey became the first state initiating welfare
waiver or reform. In addition, I restrict the sample to only women aged 15-44 years
old who reside in a pre-reform state. Then I regress time of reform adoption on
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the marriage rate. The result shows that timing of reform adoption is not affected
by prior marriage rate. As a result, cross-state variation method is valid and yields
meaningful estimates of welfare reform effect.
H. Statistical Results and Interpretation
The following subsections report the overall welfare reform effect from the probit and
Difference-in-Difference models as well as the welfare-reform component effect on the
marriage and divorce. Each welfare component is categorized into 3 discrete groups.
I present the reduced-form estimates of the effect of welfare components on family
formation as never been statistically approached before, as of my knowledge, in the
literature13 due to a complexity in welfare variables across time and across states.
Tables XIII to XVII report the probit marginal effects of the welfare reform and the
EITC expansion on a flow into the marriage. The Difference-in-Difference result for
a probability of new marriage is reported in tables XXII to XXIV. The probit and
DD estimated welfare reform effect on a flow into the divorce is illustrated in similar
fashion in tables XIV to XXI and tables XXV to XXVII, respectively.
1. The Overall Effect of Welfare Reform on the Likelihood of Marriage and Divorce
I estimate the overall effect of welfare reform using two different approaches: probit
and difference-in-difference models.
13Swann (2005) applied policy simulation such as a 10% decrease in BRR, benefit
termination (a.k.a time limit), and work trigger (a.k.a work sanction) on lifetime
structural-form behavioral model using data prior to welfare reform.
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a. Probit Estimates
Figure 6 illustrates a noticeable drop in the marriage rate after the welfare reform.
As shown in table XIII, the simple probit models of a woman changing marital status
from not being married to being married with different fixed effects are estimated.
The state and year fixed-effect model are not estimated because controlling for both
state and year left no independent variation in the welfare reform variable. Without
controlling for individual characteristics, the probability that a woman, living in a
state where the welfare reform is currently in effect, gets married in the next pe-
riod decreases by 3.91 percentage points compared with a single woman living in a
state where welfare reform has implemented yet. Estimate of welfare reform effect is
stronger and consistent once state fixed effect is introduced in the model. A woman
decreases a probability of getting married by 4.37 percentage points. However, the
year fixed-effect model does not yield any significant welfare reform effect on mar-
riage decision. EITC expansion consistently and significantly increases marriage by
probability by 2.26-4.68 percentage points.
In table XV, I report the estimated results when I control for the individual char-
acteristics and state-level measures. The magnitude and significant level of welfare
reform effect drop yet it is consistent with the findings in table XIII. For example,
the negative effect of welfare reform on flow into marriage shrinks by more than half
from 3.91 to 1.42 percentage points in non fixed-effect model. I add variables such as
pre-marital cohabitation, race, age, real weekly wage rate, MMPI, MSA, child pres-
ence, state unemployment rate, unilateral divorce laws and covenant marriage law.
Cohabitation, race, age weekly wage rate, MSA and child presence consistently show
the significant effects that do not sensitive to the model specifications. A woman who
cohabited with her partner in the last period is approximately 3 percentage points
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more likely to be married in the following year. Of all women in the sample, new
marriages among blacks are 3.74 percents less likely than that of whites. Women
aged between 25-29 are the most marriageable group as the estimate of this age
group shows the highest positive marginal effect on the transition into marriage when
compared with the rest. Women who participate in the labor force become a better
match for marriage prospects as it raises the probability of being married by 0.80-0.85
percentage points. In addition, living in the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA)
significantly decreases woman’s marriage probability. Interestingly, a woman with
dependent child is more than 1.5 percentage points more likely to wed than a woman
without children even though the shotgun marriage has already been controlled. I
use an indicator variable for a woman with infant, a child aged less than 1 year old, to
capture the possibility of shotgun marriage and I find a strongly positive magnitude
of the shotgun marriages. Nearly 7 percents of new births among unmarried mothers
follow by the marriage.
Theoretically, MMPI should yield a positive effect as an increase in the pool of
marriageable men, when controlling for the number of women, induces more mar-
riages. The results show a consistently positive and significant MMPI effect on
marriage in table XV. Covenant marriage laws unambiguously decrease women’s
probability of marriage in all specifications as expected but none of them is statisti-
cally significant. Tables XV and XVIII suggest that the Unilateral divorce laws have
a strong positive effect on the transition into and out of marriage. As the divorce
is easier to obtain in the states that hold the unilateral divorce laws, so is the mar-
riage. Women internalize the cost of divorce prior to the marriage. If it is effortless
to get divorce, then the cost of marriage is small. In contrast to table XIII, EITC
expansion turns out to have no effect on woman’s marriage after controlling for the
individual characteristics. AFDC-UP dummy variable is included in table XV to
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capture the mechanical effect. The omitted AFDC-UP category is a group of states
with no AFDC-UP. The presence of AFDC-UP should increase the marriage rate.
The finding shows a weakly positive effect of AFDC-UP program on the marriage.
Contradict to Moffitt (1990), I find that high welfare benefit generosity empirically
increases incentive to be married as contrast to the prediction in equation 3.1. The
effect of Log of real maximum cash assistance for a family of three is sensitive to the
model specification. It has an insignificant negative effect on the marriage in the non
fixed-effect and year fixed-effect models. Controlling for the state fixed effect, log
of real cash assistance significantly increases the marriage by 3.16 percentage points.
Even though it is sensitive to the specification, the positive cash benefit estimates
in model (7) and (8) are insignificant. Controlling for the economic situation, state
unemployment rate parameter yields a positive and significant effect on marriage. It
can be interpreted that women are more likely to get married during the economic
downturn. In addition, I use the median of male weekly wage by year and by state to
account for the financial attractiveness of potential mates. The results consistently
show a negative effect of financial attractiveness of potential mates in the marriage
market.
Welfare reform seems to have no significant effect on the divorce rate as reported
in table XIV. The EITC expansion increases the probability of divorce as well as mar-
riage when there is no year fixed effect (see model (1D) and (2D) in table XIV). The
negative estimate of AFDC-UP provide a consistent piece evidence of the mechanical
effect in family structure. In addition to the marriage probit model results presented
in table XV, I modify the divorce probit model as shown in table XVIII by dropping
cohabitation and male median wage rate variables and including divorce-related vari-
ables such as separation, a relative wage rate to spouse’s, and the youngest age of
the child if there are any. Married women who do not have any independent child
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are the omitted dummy variable. A woman’s relative wage rate to spouse’s variable
is included in the divorce model as Gould and Paserman (2003) argue that the rising
wage inequality has increased the returns to further search and thus increased the
option value of remaining unmarried. Therefore, it should have a positive effect on a
flow out of marriage.
There are mixed findings among Allen (1992); Friedberg (1998); Peters (1986);
and Wolfers (2006) in search for the unilateral divorce law effect on a rise in the
U.S. divorce rate. In my study, I find that the unilateral divorce laws significantly
increases a flow into divorce by approximately 0.30 percentage points. The covenant
marriage laws insignificantly decreases the divorce since it is more difficult to obtain
it. A woman’s labor force participation and a relative wage rate between wife and
husband do not affect the divorce. Compared to having no child, Married women with
children, especially the young ones, are less likely to obtain the divorce. The existence
of AFDC-UP illustrates an insignificant 0.09 to 0.28 percentage-point reduction in
the divorce likelihood. The effect of maximum cash benefit is very sensitive to the
divorce model specification. It is strictly positive when state fixed effect is controlled
for but then becomes weakly negative when no fixed effect or year fixed effect are
controlled. Welfare reform does not illustrate any significant effect on a transition
into the divorce.
b. Differece-in-Difference Estimates
The probit estimates suggest that the overall welfare reform has a negative impact
on single women’s marriage decision. Divorce, however, seems not to be affected
by any policy introduced in the welfare reform. I also estimate the Difference-in-
Difference model and the results in tables XXII to XXIV and XXV to XXVII confirm
the findings in the probit estimation. The effect of welfare reform on marriage and
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divorce probabilities is estimated by the difference-in-difference model reported in the
last column of tables XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, and XXVII. The second to
last column represents the first difference effect of the welfare reform on the treatment
group. Each table is split into 2 parts; the upper part reports the DD estimates
without controlling for the individual characteristics and the lower one reports the
DD results in which the characteristics are controlled for.
Supported by the probit estimation results, the welfare reform consistently and
strictly decreases marriage among treatment or potential welfare recipient group as
shown in the second-last column. There might be some other negative marriage-
related trend during the sampling period, therefore I set up comparison groups to
control for this concern. I define the first treatment group as high school dropout
single women with children. The comparison groups are (1) high school dropout
single women without children (2) single women with children and a high school
degree or higher. In general, the result reported in table XXII suggests that welfare
reform has a negative effect on new marriages among the potential welfare recipients
(treatment group). The marriage response from the welfare reform effect among the
treatment group is significantly lower than that of control group 1 by 1.45 percentage
points. Using control group 2, I find that welfare reform decreases the marriage
response among women in the treatment group by 0.45 percentage points, yet it is
insignificant.
As a robustness check, I use fertility and family income to identify another treat-
ment and corresponding control groups. Since the welfare caseload is approximately
3%-7%14 during 1988-2002, I propose the second treatment group as a group of single
women with children who have a family income less than 5 percentile within state and
14This statistics comes from March CPS 1988b-2002, women sample aged 15-44
who report positive amount of welfare assistance.
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year of residence15. The control groups are (1) single women without children whose
family income is less than 5 percentile and (2) single women with children whose
family income is at least 50 percentile. I disregard a sample whose family income is
between 5 to 50 percentile in order to separate unambiguously the treatment from the
control groups. The estimates are reported in table XXIII. There is no statistically
significant effect of welfare reform if I omit to control for the individual characteris-
tics. After the individual characteristics are controlled for, the DD estimate between
treatment and control group 1 shows an extremely small positive welfare reform ef-
fect, yet it is not significant. When a group of women with children whose family
income is less than 5 percentile is compared with the second comparison group which
is middle-class or higher women with children, welfare reform significantly decreases
the probability of marriage by 1.37 percentage points within 90 percent confident
interval.
The third treatment group is introduced for another round of robustness check. It
is defined as single women with children whose family income is less than 10 percentile.
The control groups are (1) single women without children whose family income is less
than 10 percentile and (2) single women with children whose family income is above
50 percentile. The estimates are reported in table XXIV. The evidence consistently
shows a negative reform effect on the marriage in the treatment group. Women with
children and family income less than 10 percentile tend to wed less than women with
children and family income above 50 percentile by 1 percentage point. To conclude,
the Difference-in-Difference estimation reveals the robust and negative welfare reform
effect on marriage decision among potentially affected women.
15National family income ranking is inappropriate for this estimation due to an
income inequality in different states. For example, families with national family
income less than 5 percentile are likely drawn from Mississippi.
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Consistent with the probit estimates, Difference-in-Difference models in table
XXV, XXVI, and XXVII suggest that there is no welfare reform effect on divorce
probability. The divorce likelihood among women in treatment groups does not sta-
tistically change after the reform was implemented as shown in the ”“difference”
estimate column. Based on my findings, I conclude that welfare reform does not
affect the divorce decision.
2. The Effect of Welfare Reform Components on the Likelihood of Marriage and
Divorce
It is well known that welfare has been completely changed after the reform. The
change in each welfare components would theoretically affect marriage decision as
explained earlier in section F. The estimates of the effect of welfare components
are reported in tables XVI (without characteristics control) and XVII (with charac-
teristics control). Model (7) represents the impact of welfare reform components in
various categories such as cash generosity, time limits, earned income disregard, and
work sanction. I redefine welfare cash benefit or earnings disregards into 3 categories,
i.e., low, medium, and high. In addition, time limit is sorted into 3 levels; i.e., no
time limits, moderate time limits, and strict time limits as described in section 3.
Specifically, work sanction categories include no work sanction, moderate work
sanction, and strict work sanction. Consistent with the previous table, model (7)
estimates a strictly positive impact of cash generosity on the marriage decision. An
increase in the cash benefit induces more marriages. Also, time limit imposes a
strong positive effect on women’s marriages. Living in a state with moderate time
limit constraint shall increase woman’s marriage probability by 1.45 percentage points
as compared with a state with no time limit. Earnings disregards and work sanction
estimates illustrate a homogenous decreasing effect on women’s marriages as direct
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work incentive gets stronger16. For example, moderate and high earnings disregards
decrease marriage probability by 0.43 and 1.02 percentage points, respectively, if
compared with low earnings disregards. Similarly, moderate and strong work sanction
significantly lessen marriage probability by 4.57 and 4.99 percentage points. As a
result model (8) is developed from the interesting results of work incentive in model
(7) by combining earned income disregard and work sanction into only 1 group named
direct work incentive.
A state is said to emphasize on a strong direct work incentive if it imposes a
high earned income disregard and some work sanctions or a strict work sanction and
a moderate or high earned income disregard. A complement of a strong direct work
incentive is a weak direct work incentive. The evidence shows that a strong direct
work incentive indeed decreases the marriage likelihood by 2.63 percentage points. I
draw a conclusion that the negative self-independence effect from working outweighs
the positive marriageable effect from working.
In addition, other welfare components such as cash benefit and time limits should
also influence marriage decision as discussed earlier. Different from earned income
disregard and work sanction, the channels through which the marriage is affected
from cash benefit and time limit are ambiguous since the work incentive is not di-
rectly impacted. I generalize work incentive category by combing all major 4 welfare
components according to how each component should affect work incentive. A state
s in year t is said to pose a strong work incentive if at least one of the welfare
components enhances work incentive and the rest are not categorized in the work
disincentive group. Components that comply with work incentive are (1) low cash
generosity, (2) strict time limit, (3) high earnings disregards, and (4) strong work
16A strong direct work incentive is defined if there is either high earnings disregards
or strong work sanction.
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sanction. Conversely, components that are categorized as work disincentive are (1)
high cash generosity, (2) no time limit, (3) low earnings disregards, and (4) no work
sanction.
I omit the estimates of work incentive from tables XVI and XVII. According
to a generalized work incentive, a strong work incentive does not affect the marriage
rate. Prior to welfare reform, previous study by Moffitt (1990) found that high benefit
generosity decreases marriages which suggesting that marriage is more likely to be
affected from other channels, rather than work incentive, that generate an opposite
impact. If marriage is an an alternative, besides the welfare, for woman to leave
poverty, she may choose marriage over the welfare. Therefore, the work incentive
incorporated in welfare shall be muted for this particular case. The complex mecha-
nism cannot be tracked down by applying a reduce-form estimation. If the marriage
substitution dominates work incentive effect, then the overall strong work-incentive
component effect on marriage decision is speculated to be positive as confirmed in
the estimates of model (9).
I categorize the welfare aggressiveness into 3 degrees of restriction to capture
the essence of attractiveness in outside option such as the marriage substitutability
if welfare is too restrictive to comply with. Welfare rule is said to be restrictive if at
least one of the following conditions holds; (1) low cash generosity with time limit,
moderate or high earnings disregards, and moderate or strong work sanction, (2)
strict time limit with moderate or high cash generosity, moderate or high earnings
disregards, and moderate or strong work sanction, (3) low earnings disregards with
moderate or high cash generosity, time limit, and moderate or strong work sanction,
and (4) strong work sanction with moderate or high cash generosity, time limit,
and moderate or high earnings disregards. The omitted variable in model (11) is a
generous welfare rule which is defined as a complement of a restrictive welfare rule.
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If some of the welfare components imposed by a state contradicts each other in terms
of welfare rule generosity, then that state has a mixed welfare rule. As speculated,
the restrictive welfare rule shows a significant positive overall effect on the marriage.
Controlling for the individual attributes, a woman living in a state with the most
aggressive welfare rule has higher marriage probability than her counterpart living in
a state with the most generous welfare rule by 0.73 percentage points. The estimates
are robust when individual characteristics are controlled for in model (12)
Unlike the marriage, it is unclear how welfare components affect the divorce
decision. Tables XIX (without characteristics control) and XX (with characteris-
tics control) show that high cash benefit generosity decreases the divorce likelihood.
Almost all disaggregated welfare-reform policies, however, insignificantly affect the
divorce decision. The divorce likelihood can not be explained by welfare policies such
as time limit, earnings disregards, and work sanction. Nevertheless, a combination of
welfare components toward the work incentive in model (8D) and (11D)suggests that
a strong work incentive indeed strictly increases the divorce.
3. The Effect of Welfare Reform Lag on the Likelihood of Marriage and Divorce
It is possible that the marriage may not respond to welfare reform immediately due
to many plausible reasons such as lack of knowledge in welfare changes. In addition,
marriage requires mutual agreement from both parties in which it may not feasible
overnight. As a result, I introduce the lags of welfare reform into model (4) to identify
such effect. I started with 4 lags and test for a null hypothesis such that all lags of
welfare reform equal to zero. If it is not rejected, I then remove 1 lag at a time and
re-test it again. The procedure discontinues when the null hypothesis is rejected.
However, I found that there is no evidence such that marriage is adjusted to any lags
of welfare reform.Interestingly, welfare reform has a strongly negative lagged effect
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on the divorce as reported in table XXI. A divorce probability significantly drops 4
years after the welfare reform was implemented.
I. Conclusion
The welfare reform has dramatically changed the image of welfare programs in the
eyes of the society. As welfare programs become less generous and require families
who seek for public assistance to fulfill several requirements, women who lead a family
have had to significantly reassess their choices of marriage, welfare, and work. This
paper investigates the behavioral and mechanical effects of welfare reform on women’s
marriage and divorce decisions. I primarily focus on marriage decisions. Yet, consid-
ering divorce helps provide a more complete understanding of the effects of welfare
reform on family composition.
I analyze a theoretical model and provide a comparative static analysis to under-
stand the mechanisms which explain women’s response in choices of family structure
as policy parameter changes. The model attributes the changes in marriage deci-
sions to the variations in the gains obtained from getting married as a consequence
of changes in each of the welfare parameters affected by the reform.
In addition to a traditional matching of individuals between pairs of years from
March CPS 1988B-2002, I introduce a converse matching procedure. This approach
allows me to include women who are not matched but whose marital status change is
detected by observing the marital status change of the matched spouses. I code the
flow into marriage and divorce as a sampled woman moves from being single to being
married and vice versa in the following year, respectively.
I use a measure of flow into and out of marriage to assess the impact of the
welfare reform on marriage and divorce decisions in probit models. Nevertheless, the
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welfare reform, which provides public assistance only to poor families with children,
should affect women with different characteristics differently. For example, low income
women with children, low income women without children, and relatively high income
women with children may respond differently to the policy changes. The micro-
level data allows for this cross-group analysis. I also estimate Difference-in-Difference
models to disentangle the welfare reform effect between the comparison and treatment
groups. Each treatment group is accompanied by two additional comparison groups
for more efficient controlling.
Probit model estimates, without any control for demographic characteristics of
the individuals, provide evidence that the welfare reform has an overall negative effect
on the probability that an unmarried woman gets married. Yet, the estimates are
sensitive to model specification. The results are robust to the inclusion of individual
characteristics in the estimation, however, the magnitude of the effects drops by more
than one half. As expected, the estimates show that the mechanical effects of the
AFDC-UP program cause a significant increase in the likelihood of marriage and a
decrease in the likelihood of divorce. In comparison with the estimation of the probit
model of all unmarried women, the Difference-in-Difference estimates suggest that
the welfare reform has a robust negative effect on marriages among the treatment
women. Even though the results show that the welfare reform has a significant effect
on the marriage decision; the divorce decision is not statistically affected.
In addition to the estimation of the effect of individual welfare components, I
estimate the effect of work incentives and welfare aggressiveness on marriage and
divorce decisions. Here I build on the methodology proposed by Blank and Schmidt
(2001). In particular, I can rank the restrictiveness of each state welfare program and
construct measures of work incentives and welfare aggressiveness.
I find that welfare policies which include direct work incentives decrease marriage.
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I conclude that the self-sufficiency effect dominates the marriageably attractiveness
from the job effect. Along with the government-funded welfare benefits, private mar-
riage may be considered as an alternative for financial support that a woman can
seek for. Theoretically, a highly aggressive welfare rule shall increase the attractive-
ness of an alternative option of financial support such as marriage. This hypothesis
is supported by the empirical findings of this paper. To investigate this issue fur-
ther, a structural model explicitly incorporating marriage as an alternative source for
financial support shall be conducted.
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CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY
Even though the U.S. government have been providing welfare programs to families
with children for many decades, previous studies have found mixed evidence of its
impact on social outcomes and have not yet reached to a consensus. In the two
essays of this dissertation I have estimated the effect of welfare reform on childbirth,
marriage, and divorce. I used flow measures of birth rates, marriage rates, and divorce
rates instead of stock measures because flow measures can detect an immediate impact
of welfare reform better.
Childbirth rates used in the first essay can be identified if a woman mothers
an infant (less than 12-months-old) by an interviewing year. Marriage and divorce
rates used in the second essay are identified through both traditional and converse
matchings. By the survey construction of CPS data, the same “household” are re-
peatedly interviewed across two consecutive years. Therefore, it is plausible to match
individuals and observe changes in their marital statuses if there is any.
This study finds a positive and significant overall effect of welfare reform on
marital birth likelihood as compared to the likelihood of no childbirth. The out-
of-wedlock birth seems to decrease as a result of welfare reform as well, yet this
effect is not significant. The overall effect of welfare reform do not statistically affect
the teenage’s child births. Strong work incentives decrease both marital and non-
marital births. However, the most aggressive welfare restriction increases marital
birth rates suggesting that when government transfer (most likely to single mothers)
is more difficult to obtain, the choice of bearing a child inside a wedlock becomes more
attractive. The results also show a strong and consistent negative effect of family caps
on additional child births.
71
The welfare reform had a negative effect on marriage but it did not affect divorce.
I investigate that the work encouragement introduced in the welfare programs lead
to a dominant effect of self sufficiency which results into a decrease in marriage.
However, women get married more often if welfare benefits available to them are
less attractive. This piece of evidence suggests that women consider marriage as an
alternative choice of financial support.
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APPENDIX A
1. Cohabitation
Cohabitation becomes an increasingly important institution in the U.S. as most
marriages are preceded by it. The 2002 National Survey of Family Growth
found that 50 percent of women aged 15 to 44 had cohabited at some point in
their lives (Stevenson and Wolfers (2007)). Even though CPS includes an “un-
married partner” category in the survey, it began in 1995, 7 years after 1988.
Fitch, Goeken, and Ruggles (2005) propose the rules for cohabitate identifi-
cation called “Persons (or Partners) of Opposite Sex Sharing Living Quarters
(POSSLQ)”. I apply those rules for designating adjusted POSSLQ household
to identify household containing unmarried partner in CPS data set through-
out the sampling period 1988-2001. The household is identified as an adjusted
POSSLQ if it complies the following arguments.
(a) Household must have a householder aged 15 or more
(b) Household must include one other person aged 15 or more who is unrelated,
not a foster child, and of the opposite sex as the householder
(c) Household cannot include any other persons aged 15 or more, except for
relatives of the references person and persons listed as a child in an unre-
lated subfamily
2. Men Marriageable Pool Index: MMPI
To measure marriage market condition exposed to a representative woman, I
introduce Male Marriageable Pool Index (MMPI) as proposed by Wilson and
Neckerman (1987). Wilson and Neckerman (1987) assumed that marriageable
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man needs to be employed and the men and women are matched by age and
race, since most people marry within their own race and near their own age.
Hence, MMPIart for woman raced r (White, Black, or Hispanic) aged a living
in state s in year t is estimated as following
MMPIarst =
EmployedMen(a−2)to(a+2),rst
Women(a−2)to(a+2),rst
Where EmployedMen(a−2)to(a+2),rst is a total numbers of employed men of race
r aged between 2 years younger and 2 years older than an observed woman
who lives in the same state at the same year. The denominator is a number of
marriage-competing women by race and age range.
3. The Earned Income Tax Credit Expansion: EITC
I construct the EITC index to represent the effect of the EITC expansion during
the 1990’s on the birth rate. It is indexed to one if the EITC expansion affects
fertility decisions and it is zero otherwise. The EITC equals one as it created
financial incentives to:
(a) a woman who does not have any children prior to 1993 to bear a child, and
(b) a woman who has only one child after 1990 to bear more children.
4. The Aids to Families with Dependent Children for Unemployed Par-
ent: AFDC-UP
The passage of the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988, effective October 1990,
extended the previously state-optional AFDC-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP)
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program to all states. Prior to October 1990, two-parent families were ineligi-
ble for cash and medical assistance in twenty-two states. Two-parent families
seeking government assistance were subjected to special restrictions and treated
differently from single-parent families and accounted for less than 10 percent
of the total AFDC caseload. The standard AFDC-UP1 program was available
for two-parent families whose combined work between a couple is less than 100
hours per month (100-hour rule), the primary earner was working at least 6 of
the last 13 quarters (work history test), and was unemployed or working fewer
than 100 hours for 30 consecutive days (waiting period). The welfare reform al-
lowed states to modify the restrictions on two-parent family applicants. Almost
all states relaxed standard AFDC-UP restrictions in effort to promote mar-
riage. However, North Dakota is the only state that does not provide benefits
to non-disabled two-parent families starting in 1998. using an availability crite-
ria, I categorize AFDC-UP into 2 groups, i.e., states that offer the AFDC-UP
program in a given year and states that do not offer it.
5. Cash Benefit Generosity
Prior to the welfare reform, individuals who are eligible for AFDC program are
also eligible for the medicaid and the food stamp benefit. The welfare benefit
package including AFDC cash assistance, medicaid, and food stamp benefits,
varies across states and over time. I collect AFDC/TANF cash assistance for
a family of three by state during 1988-20022. There are two dimensions of
benefit generosities, i.e. benefit value and benefit level, that I apply into the
1AFDC-Unemployed Parent
2Data is collected from green book and SPDP website
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estimations. Benefit generosity is categorized into 3 levels:3
Low if state’s maximum benefit value < MEAN-S.D.
Moderate if MEAN-S.D.≤ state’s maximum benefit value < MEAN+S.D.
High if state’s maximum benefit value ≥ MEAN+S.D.
Where MEAN is a sample mean of maximum benefit value by year and S.D. is
its corresponding standard deviation.
6. Time Limits
TANF imposes time limit policies including benefit reduction, benefit termina-
tion, and work requirement. Once a TANF case reaches a time limit, the case
must be granted an exception or exemption (permitted for up to 20 percent of
the caseload) or cease to receive federally-funded TANF assistance. TANF time
limit varies between 21-60 months. However, Michigan, Massachusetts, and
Vermont practically do not have time limit constraint. Once welfare recipients
exhaust federal TANF benefit subjected to the time limits, these three states
will use state-funded TANF benefit to continue supporting the ongoing welfare
recipients. Similar to the benefit generosity, I categorize the time limits into 3
levels, i.e., lenient, moderate, and strict. States with no time limit (prior to the
reform) are lenient, states with 60-month time limit are moderate, and states
with less than 60-month time limit are strict.
7. Work Requirement and Work Sanction
After having been receiving the welfare benefit for some time, all single and
two-parent families who are not exempted4 from JOBS work requirement must
3Methodology is adopted from Blank and Schmidt (2001)
4JOBS work exemption criteria varies across states, mostly applied to teenage
mothers and mothers with newborn babies.
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participate in labor force or work-related activities for 30 and 35 hours a week,
respectively, toward self-sufficiency. Recipients who do not comply with JOBS
requirement will be subjected to benefit sanction such as partial benefit reduc-
tion, full benefit reduction for some periods, or full-lifetime benefit termination.
However, states must continue the assistance for single, custodial parents who
have a child under age 6 but who cannot obtain child care. States impose dif-
ferent severities of work sanction. The degree of work sanction is outlined in
table XXIX.
8. Earned Income Disregard Effect
Welfare recipients are required to work according to JOBS work requirement
in TANF policy and the benefit is reduced as their earned income increase.
However, to promote work, they can keep some earnings and be exempted
from benefit reduction calculation. This benefit-reduction exempted income is
called earned income disregard. As a result, an increase in an earned income
disregard creates a work incentive for individual to keep income from work and
still be eligible for the same amount of welfare benefit. The AFDC program
allowed working welfare recipients to keep the first earned $120 and 33 percents
of the remaining income for income disregard purpose. Therefore, I use earned
income disregard policy under AFDC as a reference group to determine whether
the state poses more or less generosity in earning disregard effect. I, therefore,
categorize earned income disregard policy into 3 groups depending on generosity
degree; low if state has less than $90 earned income disregard, medium if $90 ≤
earned income disregard is at least $90 but not greater than $150, and high if
earned income disregard is greater than $150.
Since states have different, mixed welfare policies to encourage work, for ex-
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ample, low welfare benefit, high earning disregards, strong work sanction, and
strict time limit, it is complicated to determine the degree to which the work
is encouraged. Blank and Schmidt (2001) suggest that a state has a strong
overall work incentive if state with at least one category has the strongest work
incentives5 and no other category has the weakest work incentives6. In addi-
tion, state has a weak overall work incentive if state with at least one category
has the weakest work incentives and no other category has the strongest work
incentives; otherwise, state has a mixed overall work incentive.
9. Work Incentives
A state s in year t is said to create a strong work incentive if at least it either
imposes high earning disregards and/ or strong work sanction. Conversely, com-
ponents that are categorized as weak work incentive are low earning disregard
and/ or no work sanction. Otherwise, I consider them as having mixed work
incentives.
10. Welfare Attractiveness
A state s in year t is said to pose an attractive welfare policy if at least one of
the welfare components is in the most generous category and the rest are not
categorized in the least generous category. Components that comply with the
most attractive welfare policy are:
(a) high cash generosity,
(b) no time limit,
5for example, low welfare benefit, high earning disregards, strong work sanction,
or strict time limit.
6for example, high welfare benefit, low earning disregards, lenient work sanction,
or lenient time limit.
85
(c) high earning disregard, and
(d) no work sanction.
A state s in year t is said to pose the least attractive welfare policy if at least
one of the welfare components is in the least generous category and the rest are
not categorized in the most generous category. Components that comply with
this environment are:
(a) low cash generosity,
(b) strict time limit,
(c) low earning disregard, and
(d) strict work sanction.
If some of the welfare components are in the most generous categories and some
others are in the least generous categories, then I consider that state impose a
mixed welfare attractiveness.
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APPENDIX B
Table I.: Summary Statistics
Before the Reform After the Reform
Variable
Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Fertility 0.049 (0.22) 0.060 (0.24)
-Out of Wedlock Birth 0.007 (0.08) 0.010 (0.10)
-Marital Birth 0.043 (0.20) 0.050 (0.22)
Age 32.344 (6.91) 32.648 (7.08)
Log(wage) 4.732 (0.41) 4.830 (0.37)
MMPI 0.829 (0.10) 0.844 (0.11)
MSA 0.764 (0.43) 0.810 (0.39)
Unemploymen Rate 4.304 (1.70) 3.233 (1.71)
Labor Force Participation 0.919 (0.27) 0.764 (0.43)
Covenant Marriage 0.000 (0.00) 0.024 (0.15)
Unilateral Divorce 0.520 (0.50) 0.600 (0.49)
EITC 0.458 (0.50) 0.227 (0.42)
AFDC–UP 0.874 (0.33) 0.993 (0.08)
Log(real welfare benefits) 1.424 (0.42) 1.332 (0.40)
Poor 0.109 (0.27) 0.108 (0.31)
N 189,921 150,645
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Table II.: Heckman Two-step Selection Model
Selection Equation γ se Wage Equation β se
Married –0.1487*** (0.01) Elementary 1–4 –1.4814 (5.15)
Elementary 1–4 0.5330*** (0.04) Elementary 5–8 10.6295** (4.55)
Elementary 5–8 0.3008*** (0.03) HS Dropout 22.8894*** (4.44)
HS Dropout 0.5481*** (0.03) HS Graduates 37.6950*** (4.43)
HS Graduate 1.0620*** (0.03) Some College 51.3578*** (4.43)
Some College 1.2179*** (0.03) B.A./B.S. 102.5088*** (4.44)
B.A./B.S. 1.2958*** (0.03) Post-Graduates 156.1553*** (4.47)
Post-Graduate 1.4104*** (0.03) Black –6.2021*** (0.56)
Black –0.1230*** (0.01) Hispanic –9.2472*** (0.54)
Hispanic –0.1482*** (0.01) Age 11.7638*** (0.19)
Have any child under 6 –0.3749*** (0.01) Age Squared –0.1358*** (0.00)
Number of children –0.1522*** (0.00) Median Wage 0.0028*** (0.00)
Age 0.2033*** (0.00) MSA 21.0188*** (0.42)
Age squared –0.0032*** (0.00) Constant –218.4316*** (5.29)
Unemployment Rate –0.0403*** (0.00)
OBRAxChild 0.0469*** (0.01)
OBRAxNoChild –0.1612*** (0.01)
REFORM*Child 0.0628*** (0.01)
Constant –2.8671*** (0.05)
Obs. 505880 Obs. 366078
ρ –0.12608** (0.00)
σ 100.8356*** (0.12)
λ –12.7045*** (0.45)
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
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Table III.: Multinomial Logit Estimates on Choices of Childbirth
Base Choice: No Childbirth (1) (2) (3)
Out-Of-Wedlock Birth
EITC 1.3976*** 1.4279*** 1.5296***
(0.0620) (0.0635) (0.0709)
AFDC-UP 1.1010 1.0848 0.8934
(0.1086) (0.1152) (0.1025)
Log (real welfare cash) 1.1114 0.5779* 1.2441***
(0.0762) (0.1839) (0.0888)
Share of year that the reform is in effect 1.2590*** 1.1491* 0.9626
(0.0740) (0.0933) (0.0722)
Marital birth
EITC 1.7644*** 1.7659*** 1.8237***
(0.0327) (0.0332) (0.0359)
AFDC-UP 1.0761* 1.0512 0.9742
(0.0403) (0.0429) (0.0423)
Log (real welfare cash) 0.9419** 0.7767* 0.9935
(0.0265) (0.1021) (0.0302)
Share of year that the reform is in effect 1.1299*** 1.0854** 1.1627***
(0.0289) (0.0374) (0.0381)
Year fixed effect No No Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No
Obs. 340566 340566 340566
Pseudo R2 0.0904 0.0924 0.0915
Log-likelihood –72108.03 –71944.46 –72021.61
The estimated parameters of individual characteristics are omitted from this table.
Reported results are relative risk ratios (RRR).
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%.
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Table IV.: Multinomial Logit Estimates on Choices of Childbirth by Race
Base Choice: No Childbirth (All Race) (Black) (White)
Out-Of-Wedlock Birth
EITC 1.5296*** 1.3882*** 1.6393***
(0.0709) (0.1142) (0.0912)
AFDC-UP 0.8934 1.1526 0.8501
(0.1025) (0.2391) (0.1194)
Log (real welfare cash) 1.2441*** 0.8678 1.2548***
(0.0888) (0.1233) (0.1106)
Share of year that the reform is in effect 0.9626 0.8087 1.0311
(0.0722) (0.1154) (0.0935)
Marital birth
EITC 1.8237*** 1.5190*** 1.8499***
(0.0359) (0.1181) (0.0376)
AFDC-UP 0.9742 0.6443*** 1.0109
(0.0423) (0.1037) (0.0458)
Log (real welfare cash) 0.9935 0.9387 0.9858
(0.0302) (0.1244) (0.0311)
Share of year that the reform is in effect 1.1627*** 0.7855 1.1884***
(0.0381) (0.1281) (0.0399)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No No
Obs. 340566 35631 304935
Pseudo R2 0.0915 0.0853 0.0848
Log-likelihood –72021.61 –7547.38 –64354.47
The estimated parameters of individual characteristics are omitted from this table.
Reported results are relative risk ratios (RRR).
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%.
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Table V.: Multinomial Logit Estimates on Choices of Childbirth by Policies
OWL+ MB++ OWL+ MB++ OWL+ MB++
Base Choice: No Childbirth
(4) (4) (5) (5) (6) (6)
Cash level–Moderate 1.04 0.99 1.02 0.99
(0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Cash level–High 1.15 0.94 1.11 0.93*
(0.11) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04)
Time Limit–Mod. 1.03 0.99 1.01 0.98
(0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
Time Limit–Strict 0.87 1.07 0.89 1.09*
(0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05)
Earn. disregard–Mod. 0.83 0.86***
(0.10) (0.05)
Earn. disregard–High 0.83 0.84***
(0.10) (0.05)
Work sanction–Mod. 0.82** 0.94*
(0.06) (0.03)
Work sanction–Strict 0.91* 0.94*
(0.08) (0.04)
Work incentive–Mixed 0.66*** 0.85**
(0.09) (0.06)
Work incentive–Strong 0.75** 0.85***
(0.09) (0.05)
Welfare rule–Mixed 1.09 1.08***
(0.07) (0.03)
Welfare rule–Strict 1.08 1.15***
(0.09) (0.04)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No No
Pseudo R2 0.0915 0.0912 0.0913
Log-likelihood –62159.13 –62176.45 –62169.81
+Out–of–Wedlock Birth; ++Marital Birth
The estimated parameters of individual characteristics are omitted from this table.
Reported results are relative risk ratios (RRR).
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%.
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Table VI.: Multinomial Logit Estimates on Teen’s Choices of Childbirth by Race
Base Choice: No Childbirth (All Race) (Black) (White)
Out-Of-Wedlock Birth
HEITC 2.3513*** 1.9390*** 2.7632***
(0.3318) (0.4865) (0.4632)
AFDC-UP 0.7352 0.8088 0.8223
(0.1804) (0.3408) (0.2530)
Log (real welfare cash) 0.8045* 0.4534*** 0.9115
(0.1015) (0.1311) (0.1395)
Share of year that the reform is in effect 1.0928 0.9907 1.0885
(0.1356) (0.2663) (0.1556)
Marital birth
EITC 3.2744*** 0.4785 3.5982***
(0.6254) (0.6828) (0.6844)
AFDC-UP 0.6665 0.0000*** 0.7842
(0.1724) (0.0000) (0.2085)
Log (real cash benefit) 0.5408*** 0.1373 0.5465***
(0.1002) (0.2252) (0.1047)
Share of year that the reform is in effect 1.0065 0.9954 0.9948
(0.1919) (1.5799) (0.1916)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No No
Obs. 41991 4714 37277
Pseudo R2 0.0940 0.0755 0.0844
Log-likelihood –5756.37 –889.87 –4852.84
The estimated parameters of individual characteristics are omitted from this table.
Reported results are relative risk ratios (RRR).
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%.
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Table VII.: Probit Estimates of the Effect of Family Caps on Childbirth
Without Controling for Individual Characteristics
Control Group 1+ Control Group 2++ Control Group 3+++
mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se
Treatment Group –0.1497*** 0.3133*** –0.1029***
(0.0239) (0.0175) (0.0176)
Family Caps –0.0550 –0.0666*** –0.0341*
(0.0483) (0.0178) (0.0179)
Treat x Family Caps –0.1115 –0.0998* –0.1324***
(0.0681) (0.0511) (0.0512)
constant –1.2211*** –1.6841*** –1.2680***
(0.0175) (0.0066) (0.0068)
Obs. 24836 144464 89314
Pseudo R2 0.0044 0.0062 0.0012
Log-likelihood –7690.09 –27974.62 –28676.34
With Characteristics Control
Control Group 1+ Control Group 2++ Control Group 3+++
mfx/se mfx/se mfx/se
Treatment Group –0.0091 0.0185 –0.2704***
(0.0737) (0.0256) (0.0353)
Family Caps 0.0568 –0.0264 –0.0096
(0.0574) (0.0221) (0.0225)
Treat x Family Caps –0.1403* –0.1007* –0.1085*
(0.0760) (0.0561) (0.0561)
constant 0.2663 –1.1197*** –2.2887***
(0.5211) (0.2679) (0.2618)
Obs. 17294 119389 75519
Pseudo R2 0.0792 0.0911 0.1092
Log-likelihood –4374.64 –18259.16 –19888.22
+Disadvantaged women with one child prior.
++Non-disadvantaged women with at least two children prior.
+ + +Non-disadvantaged women with one child prior.
Reported results are marginal effects.
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%.
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Table VIII.: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Family Caps on Childbirth
Without Controling for Individual Characteristics
With Family Caps Without Family Caps Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group –1.5373*** –1.3709*** –0.0231***
(.0055) (.0025) (.0061)
Control Group 1 –1.2761*** –1.2211*** –0.0101 –0.0149*
(.0079) (.0033) (.0086) (.0092)
Control Group 2 –1.7508*** –1.6841*** –0.0061*** –0.0132**
(.0014) (.0006) (.0016) (.0065)
Control Group 3 –1.3021*** –1.2680*** –0.0060** –0.0179***
(.0028) (.0012) (.0031) (.0066)
With Characteristics Control
With Family Caps Without Family Caps Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group 0.2179*** 0.3013*** –0.0322
(.1161) (.1120) (.0220)
Control Group 1 0.3672*** 0.3104*** 0.0214 –0.0536*
(.1100) (.1105) (.0216) (.0293)
Control Group 2 –1.6984** –1.6720** –0.0025*** –0.0090***
(.0178) (.0185) (.0022) (.0056)
Control Group 3 –2.3489** –2.3394** –0.0002 –0.0012
(.0044) (.0045) (.0006) (.0008)
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99% according to the wald test.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table IX.: Sample Means of Pre-Reform Marriage
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max.
Marriage probability 0.081 (0.273) 0 1
Cohabitate 0.071 (0.256) 0 1
Black 0.172 (0.378) 0 1
Hispanic 0.065 (0.247) 0 1
Age 26.34 (8.865) 15 44
LFPR 0.667 (0.471) 0 1
Real weekly wage 264.319 (314.484) 0 10759.372
Real male median wage 535.49 (72.573) 380.996 750.19
MMPI 0.65 (0.273) 0 4.732
State unemployment rate 6.103 (1.512) 2.3 11.3
MSA 0.595 (0.491) 0 1
Unilateral divorce law 0.477 (0.499) 0 1
Covenant marriage 0 0.000 0 0
Child presence 0.272 (0.445) 0 1
Infant 0.045 (0.208) 0 1
EITC expansion 0.247 (0.431) 0 1
Welfare recipient 0.11 (0.313) 0 1
AFDC-UP availability 0.853 (0.354) 0 1
Log(real max. cash benefit) 1.464 (0.410) 0.235 2.331
Moderate cash benefit 0.633 (0.482) 0 1
High cash benefit 0.229 (0.420) 0 1
Moderate time limits 0 (0.000) 0 0
Strong time limits 0 (0.000) 0 0
Moderate earning disregard 1 (0.000) 1 1
High earning disregard 0 (0.000) 0 0
Moderate work sanction 0 (0.000) 0 0
Strict work sanction 0 (0.000) 0 0
Obs. 32473
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Table X.: Sample Means of Post-Reform Marriage
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max.
Marriage probability 0.059 (0.236) 0 1
Cohabitate 0.101 (0.301) 0 1
Black 0.163 (0.369) 0 1
Hispanic 0.108 (0.310) 0 1
Age 26.658 (9.258) 15 44
LFPR 0.675 (0.469) 0 1
Real weekly wage 283.635 (386.593) 0 10065.184
Real male median wage 549.18 (64.636) 387.378 781.486
MMPI 0.659 (0.300) 0 6.027
State unemployment rate 4.933 (1.469) 2.3 9.5
MSA 0.657 (0.475) 0 1
Unilateral divorce law 0.538 (0.499) 0 1
Covenant marriage 0.021 (0.143) 0 1
Child presence 0.268 (0.443) 0 1
Infant 0.043 (0.204) 0 1
EITC expansion 0.956 (0.205) 0 1
Welfare recipient 0.067 (0.249) 0 1
AFDC-UP availability 0.992 (0.090) 0 1
Log(real max.cashbenefit) 1.325 (0.395) 0.14 2.196
Moderate cash benefit 0.631 (0.483) 0 1
High cash benefit 0.254 (0.435) 0 1
Moderate time limits 0.617 (0.486) 0 1
Strong time limits 0.11 (0.313) 0 1
Moderate earning disregard 0.529 (0.499) 0 1
High earning disregard 0.399 (0.490) 0 1
Moderate work sanction 0.401 (0.490) 0 1
Strict work sanction 0.498 (0.500) 0 1
Obs. 28014
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Table XI.: Sample Means of Pre-Reform Divorce
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max.
Divorce probability 0.035 (0.184) 0 1
Separate 0.04 (0.196) 0 1
Black 0.068 (0.253) 0 1
Hispanic 0.058 (0.234) 0 1
Age 34.174 (6.144) 7 44
LFPR 0.731 (0.443) 0 1
Relative wage to spouse’s 0.768 (19.989) 0 3475.118
MMPI 0.852 (0.185) 0 7.85
State unemployment rate 6.04 (1.520) 2.3 11.3
MSA 0.524 (0.499) 0 1
Unilateral divorce laws 0.512 (0.500) 0 1
Covenant marriage 0 0.000 0 0
Child aged 0 0.082 (0.274) 0 1
EITC expansion 0.445 (0.497) 0 1
Welfare recipients 0.032 (0.176) 0 1
AFDC-UP availablity 0.83 (0.375) 0 1
Log(real max. cash benefit) 1.447 (0.407) 0.235 2.331
Moderate cash benefit 0.654 (0.476) 0 1
High cash benefit 0.201 (0.401) 0 1
Moderate time limits 0 0.000 0 0
Strong time limits 0 0.000 0 0
Moderate earning disregards 1 0.000 1 1
High earning disregards 0 0.000 0 0
Moderate work sanctions 0 0.000 0 1
Strict work sanctions 0 0.000 0 0
Obs. 43524
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Table XII.: Sample Means of Post-Reform Divorce
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max.
Divorce probability 0.038 (0.191) 0 1
Separate 0.039 (0.193) 0 1
Black 0.067 (0.250) 0 1
Hispanic 0.113 (0.316) 0 1
Age 34.997 (6.128) 15 44
LFPR 0.752 (0.432) 0 1
Relative wage to spouse’s 1.944 (126.714) 0 16707.221
MMPI 0.865 (0.202) 0 5.642
State unemployment rate 4.876 (1.456) 2.3 9.5
MSA 0.614 (0.487) 0 1
Unilateral divorce 0.567 (0.495) 0 1
Covenant marriage 0.02 (0.139) 0 1
Child aged 0 0.08 (0.272) 0 1
EITC expansion 0.987 (0.112) 0 1
Welfare recipients 0.019 (0.138) 0 1
AFDC-UP availablity 0.992 (0.088) 0 1
Log(real max. cash benefit) 1.314 (0.399) 0.14 2.196
Moderate cash benefit 0.64 (0.480) 0 1
High cash benefit 0.239 (0.426) 0 1
Moderate time limits 0.614 (0.487) 0 1
Strong time limits 0.117 (0.321) 0 1
Moderate earning disregard 0.53 (0.499) 0 1
High earning disregard 0.389 (0.488) 0 1
Moderate work sanction 0.4 (0.490) 0 1
Strict work sanction 0.497 (0.500) 0 1
Obs. 33972
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Table XIII.: Probit Estimates on Marriage without Characteristics Control
(1) (2) (3)
dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E.
EITC Expansion 0.0226*** (0.0028) 0.0242*** (0.0028) 0.0468*** (0.0039)
AFDC-UP –0.0045 (0.0040) –0.0007 (0.0044) 0.0010 (0.0042)
Welfare Reform+ –0.0391*** (0.0029) –0.0437*** (0.0030) 0.0066 (0.0051)
Year fixed effect No No Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No
Obs. 60487 60487 60487
Pseudo R2 0.0058 0.0124 0.0112
Log-likelihood –15430.06 –15326.67 –15345.08
Reported results are marginal effect
+Share of year that welfare reform is in effect
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
Table XIV.: Probit Estimates on Divorce without Characteristics Control
(1D) (2D) (3D)
dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E.
EITC Expansion 0.0056*** (0.0019) 0.0043** (0.0019) –0.0033 (0.0032)
AFDC-UP availability –0.0075*** (0.0029) –0.0038 (0.0031) –0.0109*** (0.0032)
Welfare Reform+ 0.0004 (0.0017) 0.0008 (0.0017) –0.0047 (0.0036)
Year fixed effect No No Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No
Obs. 77496 77496 77496
Pseudo R2 0.0006 0.0057 0.0026
Log-likelihood –12114.80 –12053.39 –12090.91
Reported results are marginal effect
+Share of year that welfare reform is in effect
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
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Table XV.: Probit Estimates on Marriage with Characteristics Control
(4) (5) (6)
dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E.
Cohabitate 0.0292*** (0.0032) 0.0281*** (0.0032) 0.0295*** (0.0032)
Black –0.0374*** (0.0016) –0.0374*** (0.0016) –0.0373*** (0.0016)
Hispanic –0.0117*** (0.0024) –0.0115*** (0.0025) –0.0113*** (0.0024)
age 20–24 0.1331*** (0.0077) 0.1369*** (0.0078) 0.1334*** (0.0077)
age 25–29 0.2069*** (0.0106) 0.2132*** (0.0109) 0.2077*** (0.0107)
age 30–34 0.1715*** (0.0104) 0.1766*** (0.0107) 0.1719*** (0.0105)
age 35–39 0.1336*** (0.0096) 0.1381*** (0.0099) 0.1348*** (0.0097)
age 40–44 0.1012*** (0.0089) 0.1058*** (0.0091) 0.1028*** (0.0090)
LFPR 0.0085*** (0.0019) 0.0080*** (0.0019) 0.0085*** (0.0019)
Median of male wage –0.0000** (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) –0.0000* (0.0000)
MMPI 0.0213*** (0.0042) 0.0178*** (0.0042) 0.0200*** (0.0042)
Unemployment rate 0.0013** (0.0005) 0.0018** (0.0008) 0.0005 (0.0006)
MSA –0.0059*** (0.0017) –0.0076*** (0.0020) –0.0059*** (0.0017)
Unilateral divorce 0.0054*** (0.0018) –0.0110 (0.0082) 0.0054*** (0.0017)
Covenant marriage –0.0040 (0.0082) –0.0100 (0.0083) –0.0030 (0.0083)
Child presence 0.0175*** (0.0023) 0.0157*** (0.0023) 0.0169*** (0.0024)
Infant 0.0664*** (0.0063) 0.0657*** (0.0063) 0.0657*** (0.0063)
EITC expansion –0.0015 (0.0024) 0.0021 (0.0026) 0.0003 (0.0035)
AFDC-UP 0.0030 (0.0029) 0.0054* (0.0030) 0.0046 (0.0032)
Log(welfare cash) –0.0008 (0.0023) 0.0316*** (0.0118) –0.0029 (0.0024)
Welfare Reform+ –0.0142*** (0.0024) –0.0119*** (0.0030) 0.0045 (0.0039)
Fixed effect? None State Year
Obs. 60486 60486 60486
Pseudo R2 0.1234 0.1267 0.1261
Log-likelihood –13601.69 –13551.27 –13560.07
Reported results are marginal effect
+Share of year that welfare reform is in effect
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
100
Table XVI.: Probit Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Components on Marriage
without Characteristics Control
(7) (8) (9)
dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E.
EITC expansion 0.0309*** (0.0028) 0.0152*** (0.0027) 0.0080*** (0.0025)
AFDC-UP –0.0091** (0.0043) –0.0066 (0.0043) –0.0128*** (0.0044)
Cash generosity–Mod 0.0114*** (0.0033) 0.0089*** (0.0033)
Cash generosity–High 0.0122*** (0.0041) 0.0049 (0.0039)
Time Limit–Mod 0.0145*** (0.0040) –0.0084*** (0.0031)
Time Limit–Strict 0.0107 (0.0068) –0.0129** (0.0050)
Earning disregard–Mod –0.0043 (0.0068)
Earning disregard–High –0.0102* (0.0060)
Work sanction–Mod –0.0457*** (0.0029)
Work sanction–Strong –0.0499*** (0.0033)
Work incentive–Mixed –0.0150** (0.0060)
Work incentive–Strong –0.0263*** (0.0029)
Mixed welfare rule 0.0250*** (0.0025)
Restrictive welfare rule 0.0073* (0.0042)
Year fixed effect No No No
State fixed effect No No No
Obs. 60486 60486 60486
Pseudo R2 0.0103 0.0049 0.0033
Log-likelihood –15359.18 –15443.02 –15468.00
The estimates are not controlled for individual characteristics
Reported results are marginal effect
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
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Table XVII.: Probit Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Components on Marriage with
Characteristics Control
(10) (11) (12)
dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E.
EITC expansion 0.0036 (0.0024) –0.0053** (0.0022) –0.0077*** (0.0020)
AFDC-UP 0.0019 (0.0030) 0.0032 (0.0029) 0.0014 (0.0030)
Cash generosity–Mod –0.0003 (0.0027) –0.0005 (0.0027)
Cash generosity–High –0.0011 (0.0031) –0.0039 (0.0030)
Time Limit–Mod 0.0142*** (0.0032) 0.0034 (0.0026)
Time Limit–Strict 0.0125** (0.0055) 0.0013 (0.0045)
Earning disregard–Mod 0.0031 (0.0049)
Earning disregard–High –0.0021 (0.0048)
Work sanction–Mod –0.0244*** (0.0024)
Work sanction–Strong –0.0261*** (0.0028)
Work incentive–Mixed –0.0116*** (0.0044)
Work incentive–Strong –0.0149*** (0.0023)
Mixed welfare rule 0.0076*** (0.0020)
Restrictive welfare rule 0.0051* (0.0032)
Year fixed effect No No No
State fixed effect No No No
Obs. 60486 60486 60486
Pseudo R2 0.1259 0.1237 0.1228
Log-likelihood –13563.22 –13597.59 –13612.02
The estimates are controlled for individual characteristics as shown in table XV but are opted out from the table
Reported results are marginal effect
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
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Table XVIII.: Probit Estimates on Divorces with Characteristics Control
(4D) (5D) (6D)
dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E.
Separate –0.0237*** (0.0011) –0.0233*** (0.0011) –0.0235*** (0.0011)
Black –0.0035 (0.0023) –0.0030 (0.0023) –0.0034 (0.0023)
Hispanic –0.0042** (0.0019) –0.0040** (0.0020) –0.0040** (0.0019)
age 20–24 0.0048 (0.0096) 0.0048 (0.0095) 0.0045 (0.0095)
age 25–29 0.0015 (0.0086) 0.0015 (0.0085) 0.0010 (0.0084)
age 30–34 0.0017 (0.0085) 0.0018 (0.0084) 0.0013 (0.0084)
age 35–39 0.0018 (0.0085) 0.0020 (0.0085) 0.0014 (0.0084)
age 40–44 0.0008 (0.0084) 0.0012 (0.0084) 0.0005 (0.0083)
LFPR –0.0007 (0.0013) –0.0007 (0.0013) –0.0008 (0.0013)
Relative wage –0.0001 (0.0002) –0.0001 (0.0001) –0.0001 (0.0001)
MMPI 0.0003 (0.0032) –0.0008 (0.0033) 0.0005 (0.0032)
Unemployment rate –0.0004 (0.0004) –0.0007 (0.0006) –0.0006 (0.0005)
MSA 0.0012 (0.0011) 0.0021 (0.0013) 0.0013 (0.0011)
Unilateral divorce 0.0031*** (0.0011) –0.0025 (0.0054) 0.0029** (0.0011)
Covenant marriage –0.0043 (0.0053) –0.0033 (0.0065) –0.0036 (0.0055)
Child aged 0 –0.0034 (0.0022) –0.0039* (0.0021) –0.0020 (0.0023)
Child aged 1–2 0.0001 (0.0019) –0.0005 (0.0019) 0.0019 (0.0021)
Child aged 3–5 –0.0023 (0.0018) –0.0029 (0.0018) –0.0008 (0.0020)
Child aged 6–8 –0.0006 (0.0020) –0.0012 (0.0019) 0.0011 (0.0022)
Child aged 9–18 –0.0016 (0.0017) –0.0024 (0.0017) –0.0000 (0.0019)
EITC expansion 0.0044*** (0.0016) 0.0068*** (0.0018) –0.0017 (0.0030)
AFDC-UP –0.0009 (0.0023) –0.0018 (0.0026) –0.0028 (0.0026)
Log(cash benefits) –0.0026* (0.0015) 0.0230*** (0.0080) –0.0023 (0.0015)
Welfare Reform+ –0.0016 (0.0016) 0.0010 (0.0021) –0.0035 (0.0030)
Year fixed effect No No Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No
Obs. 77495 77495 77495
Reported results are marginal effect
+Share of year that welfare reform is in effect
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
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Table XIX.: Probit Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Components on Divorce without
Characteristics Control
(7D) (8D) (9D)
dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E.
EITC expansion 0.0040** (0.0019) 0.0035* (0.0018) 0.0034* (0.0018)
AFDC-UP –0.0052* (0.0028) –0.0066** (0.0029) –0.0060** (0.0028)
Cash generosity–Mod –0.0003 (0.0020)
Cash generosity–High –0.0084*** (0.0022)
Time Limit–Mod 0.0021 (0.0025)
Time Limit–Strict 0.0057 (0.0040)
Earning disregard–Mod –0.0011 (0.0039)
Earning disregard–High –0.0029 (0.0036)
Work sanction–Mod –0.0008 (0.0026)
Work sanction–Strong 0.0017 (0.0030)
Work incentive–Mixed 0.0031 (0.0019)
Work incentive–Strong 0.0061*** (0.0019)
Mixed welfare rule –0.0041** (0.0017)
Restrictive welfare rule 0.0040 (0.0025)
Year fixed effect No No No
State fixed effect No No No
Obs. 77495 77495 77495
Pseudo R2 0.0021 0.0010 0.0012
Log-likelihood –12096.23 –12109.39 –12107.22
The estimates are not controlled for individual characteristics
Reported results are marginal effect
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
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Table XX.: Probit Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Components on Divorce with
Characteristics Control
(10D) (11D) (12D)
dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E.
EITC expansion 0.0046** (0.0020) 0.0039** (0.0018) 0.0037** (0.0018)
AFDC-UP –0.0044 (0.0028) –0.0056* (0.0029) –0.0050* (0.0029)
Cash generosity–Mod 0.0008 (0.0021)
Cash generosity–High –0.0072*** (0.0023)
Time Limit–Mod 0.0022 (0.0024)
Time Limit–Strict 0.0038 (0.0038)
Earning disregard–Mod 0.0005 (0.0038)
Earning disregard–High –0.0024 (0.0036)
Work sanction–Mod –0.0021 (0.0026)
Work sanction–Strong 0.0016 (0.0031)
Work incentive–Mixed 0.0014 (0.0019)
Work incentive–Strong 0.0046** (0.0020)
Mixed welfare rule –0.0033* (0.0017)
Restrictive welfare rule 0.0032 (0.0025)
Year fixed effect No No No
State fixed effect No No No
Obs. 77495 77495 77495
Pseudo R2 0.0107 0.0096 0.0097
Log-likelihood –11989.12 –12002.38 –12001.01
The estimates are controlled for individual characteristics as shown in table XVIII but are opted out from the table
Reported results are marginal effect
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
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Table XXI.: Probit Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Reform Lags on Divorce
(13D) (14D) (15D)
dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E. dF/dβ S.E.
EITC expansion 0.0060*** (0.0018) 0.0060*** (0.0018) 0.0059*** (0.0018)
AFDC-UP availability –0.0032 (0.0026) –0.0032 (0.0026) –0.0031 (0.0026)
Welfare Reform+ 0.0025 (0.0031) 0.0028 (0.0031) 0.0028 (0.0031)
Welfare Reformt−1 –0.0051 (0.0043) –0.0069 (0.0044) –0.0065 (0.0044)
Welfare Reformt−2 –0.0024 (0.0032) 0.0052 (0.0044) 0.0035 (0.0045)
Welfare Reformt−3 –0.0080** (0.0033) –0.0008 (0.0044)
Welfare Reformt−4 –0.0087** (0.0036)
Year fixed effect No No No
State fixed effect No No No
Obs. 77071 77071 77071
Pseudo R2 0.0117 0.0120 0.0122
Log-likelihood –10556.82 –10553.89 –10551.01
Prob > chi2:
All lagged WR=0 0.02 0.00 0.00
The estimates are controlled for individual characteristics as shown in table XVIII but are opted out from the table
Reported results are marginal effect
+Share of year that welfare reform is in effect
*Significant at 90%; **Significant at 95%; ***Significant at 99%
106
Table XXII.: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Reform on Marriage
Likelihood (Treatment Group: High School Dropout Women with Children)
No control for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
HS dropout with child .0423∗∗∗ .0246∗∗∗ –.0177∗∗∗
(.0041) (.0053) (.0068)
Control Groups
(1) HS dropout without child .0068∗∗∗ .0061∗∗∗ –.0008 –.0169∗∗
(.0019) (.0021) (.0028) (.0074)
(2) HS degree or higher with child .0455∗∗∗ .0368∗∗∗ –.0086∗∗∗ –.0090
(.0012) (.0014) (.0018) (.0070)
Controlled for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
HS dropout with child .0082 –.0136 –.0216∗∗∗
(.0108) (.0114) (.0068)
Control Groups
(1) HS dropout without child .0064 .0068 .0004 –.0222∗∗∗
(.0098) (.0100) (.0035) (.0073)
(2) HS degree or higher with child .0157 .0034 –.0123∗∗∗ –.0095
(.0099) (.0101) (.0026) (.0069)
*Statistically significant at 90%; **statistically significant at 95%; ***statistically significant at 99%
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Table XXIII.: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Reform on Marriage
Likelihood (Treatment Group: Women with Children and Family Income below 5
Percentile)
No control for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
Income ≤ 5 pct with child .0543∗∗∗ .0378∗∗∗ –.0165∗∗
(.0043) (.0055) (.0070)
Control Groups
(1) Income ≤ 5 pct without child .0665∗∗∗ .0473∗∗∗ –.0192∗∗ .0027
(.0056) (.0056) (.0081) (.0107)
(2) Income ≥ 50 pct with child .0325∗∗∗ .0261∗∗∗ –.0064∗∗∗ –.0100
(.0010) (.0011) (.0016) (.0072)
Controlled for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
Income ≤ 5 pct with child .0219∗∗ –.0004 –.0223∗∗∗
(.0107) (.0113) (.0070)
Control Groups
1) Income ≤ 5 pct without child .0213∗ –.0010 –.0223∗∗∗ .0000
(.0111) (.0113) (.0081) (.0105)
(2) Income ≥ 50 pct with child .0111 .0023 –.0085∗∗∗ –.0137∗
(.0097) (.0099) (.0024) (.0071)
*Statistically significant at 90%; **statistically significant at 95%; ***statistically significant at 99%
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Table XXIV.: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Reform on Marriage
Likelihood (Treatment Group: Women with Children and Family Income below 10
Percentile)
No control for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
Income ≤ 10 pct with child .0485∗∗∗ .0362∗∗∗ –.0123∗∗
(.0033) (.0041) (.0053)
Control Groups
(1) Income ≤ 10 pct without child .0602∗∗∗ .0468∗∗∗ –.0133∗∗ .0010
(.0041) (.0043) (.0060) (.0080)
(2) Income ≥ 50 pct with child .0231∗∗∗ .0159∗∗ –.0072∗∗∗ –.0091∗
(.0064) (.0078) (.0026) (.0055)
Controlled for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
Income ≤ 10 pct with child .013 –.0052 –.0182∗∗∗
(.0104) (.0107) (.0053)
Control Groups
(1) Income ≤ 10 pct without child .0225∗∗ .0046 –.0178∗∗∗ –.0004
(.0105) (.0107) (.0062) (.0079)
(2) Income ≥ 50 pct with child .0106 .0024 –.0083∗∗∗ –.0100∗
(.0097) (.0099) (.0025) (.0055)
*Statistically significant at 90%; **statistically significant at 95%; ***statistically significant at 99%
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Table XXV.: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Reform on Divorce Like-
lihood (Treatment Group: High School Dropout Women with Children)
No control for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
HS dropout with child .0289∗∗∗ .0317∗∗∗ .0028
(.0029) (.0037) (.0047)
Control Groups
(1) HS dropout without child .0036∗∗∗ .0404∗∗∗ .0045 –.0017
(.0064) (.0079) (.0103) (.0011)
(2) HS degree or higher with child .0310∗∗∗ .0325∗∗∗ .0015 .0013
(.0009) (.0011) (.0014) (.0049)
Controlled for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
HS dropout with child .0246∗∗∗ .0243∗∗∗ –.0003
(.0091) (.0093) (.0045)
Control Groups
(1) HS dropout without child .0302∗∗∗ .0251∗∗ –.0052 .0049
(.00102) (.0107) (.0095) (.0104)
(2) HS degree or higher with child .0275∗∗∗ .0248∗∗∗ –.0027 .0024
(.0088) (.0087) (.0017) (.0045)
*Statistically significant at 90%; **statistically significant at 95%; ***statistically significant at 99%
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Table XXVI.: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Reform on Divorce Like-
lihood (Treatment Group: Women with Children and Family Income below 5 Per-
centile)
No control for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
Income ≤ 5 pct with child .0294∗∗∗ .0310∗∗∗ .0017
(.0013 (.0017) (.0022)
Control Groups
(1) Income ≤ 5 pct without child .0300∗∗∗ .0385∗∗∗ .0085∗ –.0069
(.0027) (.0036) (.0045) (.0050)
(2) Income ≥ 50 pct with child .0324∗∗∗ .0327∗∗∗ .0003 .0014
(.0012) (.0013) (.0018) (.0028)
Controlled for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
Income ≤ 5 pct with child .0228∗∗∗ .0206∗∗ –.0023
(.0089) (.0089) (.0023)
Control Groups
1) Income ≤ 5 pct without child .0280∗∗∗ .0282∗∗∗ .0001 –.0024
(.0089) (.0090) (.0045) (.0046)
(2) Income ≥ 50 pct with child .0278∗∗∗ .0247∗∗∗ –.0031 .0009
(.0089) (.0088) (.0020) (.0026)
*Statistically significant at 90%; **statistically significant at 95%; ***statistically significant at 99%
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Table XXVII.: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of the Effect of Welfare Reform on Divorce
Likelihood (Treatment Group: Women with Children and Family Income below 10
Percentile)
No control for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
Income ≤ 10 pct with child .0291∗∗∗ .0252∗∗∗ –.0039
(.0049) (.0063) (.0081)
Control Groups
(1) Income ≤ 10 pct without child .0271∗∗ .0222∗ –.0049 .0010
(.0110 (.0118) (.0163) (.0182)
(2) Income ≥ 50 pct with child .0310∗∗∗ .0328∗∗∗ .0019 –.0058
(.0008) (.0010) (.0013) (.0082)
Controlled for individual characteristics
Pre-reform Post-reform Diff Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group
Income ≤ 10 pct with child .0212∗∗ .0121 –.0091
(.0098) (.0104) (.0075)
Control Groups
(1) Income ≤ 10 pct without child .0176 .0035 –.0140∗∗∗ .0049
(.0131) (.0135) (.0150) (.0167)
(2) Income ≥ 50 pct with child .0300∗∗∗ .0277∗∗∗ –.0023 –.0068
(.0087) (.0087) (.0017) (.0076)
*Statistically significant at 90%; **statistically significant at 95%; ***statistically significant at 99%
112
Table XXVIII.: Linear Combination of the Coefficients in Diff-in-Diff Model
Pre-Reform Post-Reform Difference Diff-in-Diff
Treatment Group αˆ0 + αˆ1 αˆ0 + αˆ1 + αˆ3 + αˆ4 αˆ3 + αˆ4
Control Group 1 αˆ0 + αˆ2 αˆ0 + αˆ2 + αˆ3 + αˆ5 αˆ3 + αˆ5 αˆ4 − αˆ5
Control Group 2 αˆ0 αˆ0 + αˆ3 αˆ3 αˆ4
Table XXIX.: Category of the Severity of State Work Sanction
No sanction Moderate Strong
Sanction Period No Less than 1 year More than 1 year
Benefit reduction No Partially Partially or Full
113
APPENDIX C
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Fig. 1.: Cross-State Variation in Welfare Reform Implementation Year
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Fig. 2.: Matching Rate of White Women Aged 15–44 by Year and Age
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Fig. 3.: Matching Rate of Black Women Aged 15-44 by Year and Age
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Fig. 4.: Comparison of Proportion of Married Women by Age
Fig. 5.: Marriage Rate Comparison
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Fig. 6.: Marriage Rate of Women from Matched March CPS
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Fig. 7.: Divorce Rate of Women from Matched March CPS
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Fig. 8.: Marriage Rate of Women by Age Group
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Fig. 9.: Marriage Rate of Women by Race
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